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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
People's motivations for giving are impure. Pure motivations result in gifts of time or 
money that are purely selfless. A selfless gift of time or money will keep an agent's utility 
level the same or less than it would have been without the donation. Imagine economic 
assumptions where firms are not profit maximizers and individual's utility can be increased 
by factors other than personal consumption. These kind of assumptions are distinct from the 
usual assumptions expected in economics; however, this is to some degree what is observed 
in the case of charitable giving. In 1776, Adam Smith may have wondered what prompted a 
self-interested individual to give. Adam Smith wrote, "it is not the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker from which we expect to receive our dinner..." (p. 154). 
We observe benevolent behavior in the U. S. and all over the world. Gifts of time and money 
are important factors in determining social welfare. Monetary contributions have received 
the most attention over the past 30 years, which is one reason why time gifts are the focus of 
this research (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). The purpose of this dissertation is to determine 
whether people's decision to contribute time is dependent upon how much time other people 
are giving. Standard economic reasoning would lead one to think that no one would give to 
the needy since people believe that other people will help out those poor individuals. This is 
the free/easy-rider concept for public goods (Comes and Sandler, 1984, 1996). If a privately 
supplied pure public good is intended to be funded voluntarily, it is common to observe 
people thinking that other people will pay for the good. Therefore, it is likely that public 
good production will be less than what is efficient and possibly not produced at all. Since a 
substantial amount of giving is observed in the United States (over $122 billion of monetary 
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contributions in 1990 and 38 million volunteers in 1989), one safely can shelve the pure 
public good model as an underlying model of charity (Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1994, 
Hayghe, 1991). Nevertheless, the pure public good model will serve as a benchmark case. 
An interesting observation is that people of all income levels give time and/or money. 
The level of monetary gifts tends to be higher among a set of contributors as income rises, but 
what about the gift of time? All people are endowed with an equal amount of hours in a day, 
which makes time donations unique when compared to monetary donations. Valuing time is 
no exact science. Certainly, each individual has an opportunity cost. Hodgkinson and 
Weitzman (1994) valued 19.4813 billion hours of volunteer time in 1993 at $9.38 per hour 
(the average nonagricultural hourly wage plus 12% for fringe benefits). Whether that means 
anything to the agents receiving the time donation may differ case by case. The 
administrators of a soup line at a homeless shelter are indifferent to having a accountant or a 
janitor serving food at noon. Church members, however, may prefer an accountant over a 
janitor to serve as treasurer. The accountant may find it refreshing to scoop soup for the 41st 
hour of his work week rather than spend it working. It is not hard to imagine that the 
accountant is tired of accounting after 40 hours of work and would not consider spending his 
41st hour working. This type of attitude by the accountant makes his wage inappropriate to 
serve as his opportunity cost. Time can be valued at the donor's or the recipient's 
opportunity cost, the two values need not be equal (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1996). 
Time donors may give where their value of marginal product is highest according to 
their skills (Andreoni, et. al., 1995). This theory would imply that the accountant gets more 
utility donating accounting time than soup serving time. Does a donor gain utility because of 
the money he is "saving" the recipient, or just from the raw amount of time he gives (Roy and 
Zimek, 2000)? A donor may be giving time to gain skills and/or experience to increase his 
income in the labor market (Day and Devlin, 1998). Brown and Lankford (1993) investigate 
another possibility, workers constrained by hours worked. If workers desire to work more 
and cannot, the opportunity cost of volunteering is no longer lost wages. Under this situation, 
an appropriate variable to estimate gifts of time is available hours (Clotfelter, 1985). Use of 
available hours as an independent variable implies a sequential decision-making process. A 
person's allocation of time to charity work most likely follows his or her labor decision- i.e., 
the number of hours worked. An appropriate theoretical structure to consider under these 
circumstances is a separable utility function (Pollak and Wachter, 1975). This dissertation 
develops a unique application of a separable utility function that supports household's 
focusing their decision of volunteer time on how much available time they have and other 
preference parameters. It will be argued theoretically and empirically that household's 
volunteer efforts are best modeled this way. 
Within the topic of charitable giving are two items that are not in line with traditional 
economic thinking. First, the firms supplying the good are often not seeking profits, or are 
believed to not be profit seeking (Hansmann, 1980). Second, individuals appear, to some 
degree, not to be self-interested or to possess some unusual variables in their utility function 
(Sugden, 1984, Kaplow, 1995). Some common principles of economics are disrupted. 
Predictions about people's actions will change under different policies. In response to policy 
changes, good predictions about philanthropic behavior are crucial to social welfare. In 1997, 
President Clinton took a proactive role in encouraging citizen's participation in volunteerism. 
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He and many others are suggesting that the economy will experience real effects from a rise 
in volunteer work. Propaganda of this nature can spur people into giving, although it may be 
short-lived if the spirit of camaraderie slows as the efforts of the politicians move toward 
other topics. 
Taxes undoubtedly play a role in determining the level of monetary gifts, but tax 
effects on gifts of time are less clear. A consumer's marginal tax rate is used for the 
calculation of the price of a monetary gift, because an itemizing taxpayer's income is reduced 
by the amount of the monetary gift, thereby reducing the person's tax liability (Long, 1977, 
Dye, 1980, Feenberg, 1987, Reece and Ziechang, 1987, Weisbrod, 1988, Auten, Cilke, and 
Randolph, 1992, Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Most authors, who have written on time gifts, have 
used the price of monetary gifts to estimate a relationship between monetary gifts and time 
gifts. Arguments against this practice are made in chapter three. 
The amount of time a person volunteers may depend on how much time others have 
given, especially those close to the giver. One would suspect interdependent preferences 
among household members. Estimation of an individual's utility maximization problem 
without considering the entire household may create inefficient and/or biased coefficients. 
This paper shows the differences between modeling decisions of volunteer time for a 
household and an individual. Available time and other people's time are instrumental to the 
determination of an individual's choice of gifts. If people are determining their gifts in the 
same time period, simultaneous equation techniques should be used to estimate the 
coefficients of the demand for charitable giving. 
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The roles of the agents must be kept straight. The individual supplying the gift is 
considered to be the consumer of the charitable good, because he or she is forgoing private 
consumption so that someone else may consume. The individual(s) consuming the charitable 
good is (are) in reality supplying "need" to the donor. A transaction between these two 
agents can and does take place without any need for a government or a nonprofit firm. For 
the most part a nonprofit firm serves as an intermediary between the consumer and the 
supplier (Posnett and Sandler, 1988). Many nonprofit firms package need in a variety of 
ways and then "sell" it to consumers. For example, the United Way has fundraising activities 
that are targeted to specific projects like providing food to villages in Ethiopia. Money that is 
donated will be earmarked, as prescribed by the donor, to a certain project. Nonprofit firms 
are always presumed to be agents for someone or something else. Contrast that idea with the 
traditional for-profit firm which is presumed to be representing its shareholders or proprietor. 
By keeping these characteristics of the good in mind, one starts to realize the 
possibilities of how charitable gifts fit into the household's decision process. We have two 
general gifts to contemplate, money and time. Each of these gifts has distinct, but interrelated 
constraints. Money gifts are bound by the amount of money generated in income from 
resources of a given household. Time gifts are bound by the amount of hours in the day, less 
some time for sleep. The interrelation of the two gifts is that one way for the household to 
generate income is through time in the labor market, but this uses up available time to give. 
An interesting question is what time horizon household's consider when choosing their level 
of gifts. Some household's may think of a daily devotion, others may set a certain level of 
gifts for the year, and others may be thinking that they will work hard while they are young, 
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save, and give time and money when they retire. Different theoretical approaches to how a 
household solves a utility maximization problem of this kind are explored in Chapter 3. The 
resulting demand equations from different theoretical approaches can be tested. 
Another issue with these models is that gifts of time are censored at zero. Many 
people choose not to give time and in fact may choose negative amounts of time if it were 
possible. The most common way to deal with this issue empirically is by using a Tobit 
model. Chapter 5 covers the empirical results of using a Tobit model to test whether the data 
from 2,347 households support a household or individual approach to modeling gifts of time. 
The empirical section also covers allocations of time among households and also among 
spouses. Interesting questions arise when someone begins to think about charitable gifts of 
time. How should the household be modeled given that there is likely two decision makers in 
one household (Pollak, 1976)? Problems of simultaneous decision making must be 
overcome in empirical estimation of giving behavior. Do spouses tend to give time together, 
or does the household tend to have the spouse with the lowest opportunity cost give while the 
other works? Do households who give time to church tend to be the households who give to 
other types of organizations? Do households use gifts of time as a substitute for gifts of 
money? Does a household's income level help determine the amount of time they give? The 
data suggests answers to these types of questions. 
The remainder of the thesis consists of five chapters. A review of the nonprofit sector 
follows this chapter. In the third chapter, theoretical models are presented starting with 
general models of public goods and then building to basic models of charitable contributions. 
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Chapter four discusses a household approach to charitable giving. The fifth chapter covers a 
description of the data and econometrics. Concluding remarks are in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2. NONPROFIT SECTOR REVIEW 
A brief review of the nonprofit sector is essential to an understanding of the insights 
to the demand side of charitable giving. Competition and the incentive of profits drive most 
private good markets to an efficient level of production. There are goods, however, that fail 
to allow for competition or profits due to the characteristics of the goods. Private goods, like 
a cheeseburger, have characteristics of 1) being able to have only one person enjoy the 
benefits of consuming the good and 2) being able to exclude non-payers of the good. Private 
good's benefits are said to be rival and excludable. Public goods, like national defense, with 
non-rival and non-excludable benefits, are desired by consumers but may need to be provided 
by producers through non-market means. This follows because producers will have a 
difficult time making money producing goods which can be enjoyed without payment! There 
are also goods like golf courses that have a mixture of non-rivalry and excludability. These 
types of goods are referred to as impure public goods or club goods (Comes and Sandler, 
1996). 
Profits may also not be the driving force due to some altruistic motive of the producer 
or apprehension by consumers of getting the good from a profit-seeking producer or both. 
Hansmann(1980) pointed out three conditions which facilitate an efficient market. The 
conditions are "that consumers can, without undue cost or effort, (a) make a reasonably 
accurate comparison of the products and prices of different firms before any purchase is 
made, (b) reach a clear agreement with the chosen firm concerning the goods or services the 
firm is to provide and the price to be paid, and (c) determine subsequently whether the firm 
complied with the resulting agreement and obtain redress if it did not" (p. 843). If the 
consumer cannot do any one of these things, there will be at least an underproduction of the 
good and more likely no production at all in a for-profit setting. Under the circumstances 
outlined above, a nonprofit enterprise may at least mitigate the market failure. To further 
complicate the problem, these goods are often characterized by some degree of publicness, 
through nonexcludability and/or nonrivalry. Some examples of goods and/or services that are 
of this nature are health care, museums, education, research, and the media. 
An important characteristic of a nonprofit firm is that it can earn a profit, but is 
committed by law not to distribute it. This is precisely how for-profit and nonprofit firms 
differ. Can the nonprofit firm successfully distribute earnings through a veil of inflated 
wages, company cars, and other perks? In some cases, the answer is yes; however, through 
institutional arrangements like government monitoring, activities like these can be 
minimized. Even if there are no such arrangements, the output from a nonprofit firm is 
expected to be closer to the efficient level than that which would be produced in a for-profit 
setting. This implies a second-best answer to the market failure (Hansmann, 1980). 
Within the nonprofit literature a person finds some interesting topics specific to the 
nonprofit field. One of these issues is the firm's objective. If profits are not the driving 
force, then is it the number of souls saved, the proportion of sick to healthy, the whale count, 
or any other ideological objective? While these functions are not easily defined or proxied, 
some of the literature has tried to estimate if the firms are acting as revenue maximizers or 
net revenue maximizers (Khanna and Sandler, 1999, Khanna, Posnett and Sandler, 1995, 
Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986, Steinberg, 1987, Rose-Ackerman 1982). A revenue 
maximizer incurs fundraising expenses until the revenue generated by the last dollar spent is 
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zero. A net revenue maximizer incurs fundraising expenses until the revenue generated by 
the last dollar spent is equal to the cost of what it took to get that last dollar. 
Competition between for-profit and nonprofit firms is another relevant issue in this 
area (Hansmann, 1980). For example, suppose two firms produce goods that are similar 
and/or relatively substitutable for each other. One of the firms also produces other products, 
some with tax-exempt status, others without. The multi-product firm may be able to shift 
costs from the nonexempt good to the exempt good giving an "unfair" advantage (Weisbrod 
1988). Weisbrod also discusses the potential for deception in the nonprofit sector. The 
producer, being a profit maximizer, sees the nonprofit sector as a great way to avoid the 
burden of corporate tax. If the industry has imperfect monitoring, a profit maximizer may do 
quite well in the nonprofit arena. Another issue is when for-profits and nonprofits engage in 
joint ventures. This can take a multi-product form or may be as simple as IBM and the 
United Way advertising products on television in the same ad. The issue is whether a for-
profit finn gets an unfair advantage over its competitors by collaborating with a nonprofit 
firm that gained social status and respect through tax exempt activities. 
It is important to understand the role of the government in the nonprofit sector. The 
government is the most natural enforcer of the implicit contract between the consumer and 
producer of a charitable good. The essential element needed for transactions to occur when 
one of Hansmann's conditions is not met is the non-distribution of profits. By having the 
donor know that the firm is nonprofit, he is less likely to be worried about his donation 
getting to the end user. The government provides the infrastructure necessary to document 
that the firm is nonprofit. Note, however, that the government is not necessary for carrying 
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out of transactions of this nature. There is no reason why private agents in small numbers 
could not adopt a successful plan to carry out a contract (Coase, 1954). The government is 
the most commonly used because transactions of this sort typically involve large numbers of 
agents for which it would be too costly to use private contracts. The most common function 
provided by the government is monitoring. Private agents acting on their own could not 
feasibly monitor the firm's behavior. 
The next consideration is government financing the monitoring need and other forms 
of output. The government not only helps identify the "worthiness" of the cause through the 
non-distribution criterion, but can also impose payments to the nonprofits. Since many 
charitable goods are public in nature, there will be free or easy riding associated with them so 
that the government may have to support them through taxation. Taxation will alleviate 
some free riding, but can affect current contributors to the pure public good. The neutrality 
theorem asserts that an individual who is taxed an amount equal to the value of the pure 
public good he will receive will reduce his private purchases of the public good by the 
amount of the tax (Bergstrom, et. al., 1986). From general tax revenues, the government can 
attempt to ameliorate the market failure derived from the public aspect of the goods by 
subsidizing the nonprofit firms directly or indirectly. The problem with this is that private 
contributors may decrease voluntary contributions in response to government donations. This 
idea is called "crowding out" (Duncan, 1999, Steinberg, 1991, Rose-Ackerman, 1986, 
Abrams and Schmitz, 1978, 1984). Note that it is possible to have "crowding in", for 
example, if consumers consider government involvement as positive information in 
evaluating the charity as a worthy cause (Khanna and Sandler, 2000, Rose-Ackerman, 1986, 
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1982). Direct subsidies are basically a check written from the government to the nonprofit 
firm. The nonprofit can direct these funds toward operating expenses or output as it desires. 
Indirect subsidies consist of money directed toward a specific purpose, such as low postage 
rates or free advertising on radio or television. 
Another role that the government can fill is that of an information provider. For 
example, the government can authorize certain types of nonprofits and assign them a tax 
code. These services require tax dollars, so one should carefully analyze the benefits of 
relieving the informational asymmetry to the associated costs. Other informational 
asymmetries that may exist can be mitigated or eliminated through monitoring the operations; 
for instance, organizations that provide relief to third world nations are monitored. The 
government can publish the fraction of donations actually received in the third world and the 
amount goes toward fundraising expenditure and administrative costs. 
Now that basic information regarding the nonprofit sector has been presented, 
theoretical models are explored in chapter three. The theoretical models have been designed 
to test the issues raised in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
General Models of Public Goods 
The purpose of this chapter is to show some different ways that charitable gifts can be 
modeled. The public nature of charitable gifts has interesting implications for a utility 
function. This chapter starts with basic models of public goods. Then a canonical model of 
charitable gifts is examined, followed by a discussion of how charitable gifts differ from 
other goods. In the chapter's last section, time gifts are separated from monetary gifts. 
Controversial comments against the use of the tax price of monetary gifts in modeling gifts of 
time are presented. Such comments are controversial, because most volunteer models have 
used the tax price of monetary gifts to determine if the two goods are complements or 
substitutes. 
Recall that the two important features of the benefits of a public good are non­
excludability and non-rivalry (see p. 8). The benefits (harm) of the public good will spread to 
all agents through the group of agents who choose to buy or provide it. This means that the 
utility function for each individual will contain other people's levels of consumption. As 
stated earlier, the private provision of a pure public good model will be used as a benchmark 
case. The typical way of representing a pure public good is by using a summation technology 
of supply, in which the aggregate level of the good is the sum of the individual contributions 
(Comes and Sandler, 1996). This method assumes that individuals care only about the 
aggregate level of the pure public good. In the simplest case, it does not matter who actually 
purchases or provides the public good. The summation technology implies that each 
contributor's provision is perfectly substitutable. Define an individual's problem as 
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maximizing a strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function (U,(-)) dependent 
on a private good yj and a pure public good, Q. The budget constraint for this maximization 
problem has p as the relative price of the public good and I, as the ith consumer's income, q, 
is agent i's contribution and q^Eq,-, for i^j, is all others' contributions to the public good. 
max Uj(yj,Q) (1) 
Yi,qi 
subject to pqj+yi=Ij, (2) 
qi+q(i)=Q> (3) 
yi,qi>0. (4) 
Equation (2) is a standard budget constraint, (3) shows that the public good is the sum of the 
private contributions from each individual, and the non-negative constraints are in (4). Under 
this private provision framework, the first order condition for an interior solution generated 
by the market: 
MRS'Qy=p, qi>0 (5) 
This expression shows that consumers will choose a level of q; and y where their willingness 
to trade the public good (Q) for the private good (y), their MRS Qy, is equal to what they are 
able to trade in the market, the relative price p. Using a Benthamite social welfare utility 
function: 
U = E U i ( y j , Q )  ( 6 )  
i=l 
and a constraint: 
Iii =PQ +  Z Y i  (7) 
i=i i=i 
The social welfare optimum must satisfy: 
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ZMRS'çy = p (8) 
i=l 
or MRS'qy + ZMRSJQy = p (9) 
j*i 
The market first order condition (5) does not match the Pareto condition (8), because 
individuals do not take into account that their contribution qi potentially benefits all other 
individuals (the second left-side term of (9)) by raising the level of Q. Thus, each individual 
does not provide enough qi and the market fails to provide the first best solution. 
An extension of the pure public good model is the joint products model (Comes and 
Sandler, 1984). The latter model maintains the summation idea to some extent, but it also 
asserts consumers gain another form of satisfaction jointly with the level of the public good. 
This can be viewed in two ways. One way is that two different goods are being produced 
from one primary resource. A second way is to think in terms of the household theory of 
consumption. This theory asserts that individuals derive satisfaction from different 
characteristics of an activity. The new variables introduced here capture the joint products 
produced by qi, which is an activity that produces x, and Zj. Contrast this specification with 
the pure public good model. The summation of the public component is preserved but is now 
applied to one of the characteristics derived from q,. Let a and (3 be fixed proportion 
parameters creating a linear relation between the level of qi and quantities of Xj and z,. Note 
that if a=0 and (3=1, the model reduces to the pure public good model. Xj is the private 
characteristic specific to consumer i. z\ and z(i) are the public component enjoyed or disliked 
by individual i and others, respectively. For example, suppose a person decides to put a new 
exhaust system on his or her car because he or she is tired of the noise. In so doing, he or she 
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not only benefits from the noise reduction (aq), but also confers a benefit to the community 
(Pq) by way of reducing noise and air pollution. 
Let individual i maximize a utility function that is continuously differentiate, strictly 
increasing and strictly quasi-concave: 
Uj=Uj(yi,Xj,Zj+Z(j)) (10) 
subject to: 
ii=yi+pqi> (li) 
Z=Zi+Z(,)=Pql+pq(i)=pQ, (12) 
Xi=aqj, (13) 
Zj=Pqj for every i. (14) 
Decisions on the level of y, and qj are based on the exogenous variables, income and other's 
choices of q^, and the preference parameters, a and p. Equation (11) is a standard budget 
constraint and (12) shows the public good Z as the sum of the individual's production of Zj. 
Equations (13) and (14) show the private and public good produced from qj, respectively. 
The Lagrangian function for solving this problem is: 
L= Uj(yj,aqj,pqj+pq(j))+ X(Ij-yj-pq,). (15) 
The first order independent, Nash conditions for the joint products model generated in the 
market are: 
p - MRSlqy=aMRS'xy+pMRSlZy, for every i. (16) 
This equation implies that the consumer's decision of how much q to consume is based on a 
productivity weighted average of his marginal rate of substitutions. His willingness to 
substitute the jointly produced private characteristic with the private good is weighted by a. 
His willingness to substitute the jointly produced public characteristic with the private good 
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is weighted by (3. The Pareto optimal consumption of the two goods would be again 
determined by a Samuelson condition (Comes and Sandler, 1984, 1996): 
p = aMRS'Xy+ p X  M R S J Zy i=l,...,n. ( 17) 
J=! 
Once again, the independent and Pareto optimal first order conditions are different. The 
difference arises because the market solution in (16) ignores the spillover benefits from the 
public component. This means there may be room for an optimistic economist to design a 
mechanism to bring about the efficient solution, but this is not the focus of this dissertation. 
Basic Models of Charitable Contributions 
A basic model of charitable contributions would need to include all possible 
contributors to a good in which its benefits are presumed to be shared by many. As discussed 
previously, it is difficult to think of an organization that collects contributions that does not 
benefit more than a few people with the output it produces. When modeling this type of 
good, four main agents are identified: an individual donor, all other private donors, a charity 
and the government. As may be expected there are interdependencies among each agent. 
There is no consensus in the literature on the crowding that agents cause each other. Indeed 
some have hypothesized and demonstrated crowding-in rather than crowding-out (Khanna 
and Sandler, 2000, Rose-Ackerman, 1982). 
A general model would include a utility function that exhibits the usual concavity and 
differentiability requirements like equation (10): 
Ui=Ui(Yi,Q) (18) 
and constraints: 
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Ii=Yj+pCi 
Q=Ci+C(j)+G 
Yj,C,>0 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
where Yj, Cj and I, is the ith agent's private good consumption, charitable contribution, and 
income, respectively. C(j) is all other private contributions and G is government support of 
the charitable good. A standard budget constraint is shown in equation (19). Equation (20) 
shows that the public good Q is created from three different, perfectly substitutable, sources. 
The non-negative constraints are in (21). 
The focus of many papers is on agent's perception of the other agents' contributions 
(Schiff, 1985, Andreoni, 1990, Rose-Ackerman, 1986, Kingma, 1989). The treatment of Q 
as a pure public good was one of the initial models in the literature. It has the well-known 
prediction that private contributions will be crowded out dollar for dollar by government 
contributions (Roberts, 1984). If, however, non-contributors are involved in the tax and 
spend policy, less than dollar for dollar crowding would be expected (Bergstrom, et. al., 
1986). Schiff (1985) concluded that it is important to differentiate by the source of 
contribution and he suggested that agents receive different amounts of utility depending on 
the source— gift is from that agent, some other agent or the government. Schiff modeled this 
idea by having the aforementioned variables in the utility function as arguments along with a 
private good. Crowding of the agent's gift will differ depending on the source. 
The "impure altruist" model of Andreoni (1990) differs by the assumption that people 
care about the amount of their donation and the total level of contributions. This implies that 
others' donations and government's donations are perfect substitutes. The implication on 
crowding for this model is less than dollar for dollar due to the private benefits from the act 
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of giving. Furthermore, this model helps reconcile the fact that most households do give 
money and the amount of the household gift is often large. These empirical observations are 
impossible to reconcile with the pure public good model. 
The price of giving, p, is different for itemizers and non-itemizers. People who 
itemize their tax returns face a price of giving of: 
P=(W), (22) 
where t is the marginal tax rate. This representation implies that a person facing a t=33% is 
giving up $.67 worth of private goods for each dollar of donations. If agents do not itemize, 
however, they are giving up $1 of private goods for each dollar given. To go one step further, 
one should take into account that part of the dollar given to charity goes toward 
administration and fundraising (Khanna and Sandler, 2000, Rose-Ackerman, 1982). 
Therefore, if consumers are truly interested in how much charitable output their dollar buys, 
the price of giving should be: 
p=(l-t)/[l-(f+a)], (23) 
where f is the fraction of donations that is put toward fundraising expenditure and a is the 
fraction spent on administrative expenses. Together, these two items raise the price of 
giving, offsetting the effect of the marginal tax rate. Suppose that t=33% and f+a=20%. This 
then implies an effective price of p=.8375. The effect of the tax price of monetary gifts on 
gifts of time will be further discussed in the next section. 
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Time as a Gift 
Models of time donations are few. This may be due to a social need for concentration 
on monetary donations starting in the 1970's. It may also be due to the lack of available data 
on time gifts relative to monetary gifts for the last 30 years. Previous researchers interested 
in charitable giving have had monetary gifts from tax returns at their disposal. Time gift data 
is not as easy to find. Previous attempts to explain gifts of time have come from unspecified 
utility functions (Brown and Lankford, 1992). In the Brown and Lankford paper, money and 
time donations were estimated simultaneously. A determinant of time and money donations 
worth noting in their paper is available time. They did not presume the price of giving per 
hour as the after-tax wage rate. What they did assume is that people are constrained by their 
current work load. They either have optimally chosen their level of work or could not work 
more hours if they wanted to. This leaves 16 available hours minus average hours of market 
work. The Independent Sector data showed that only 53% of workers in the sample would be 
able to work additional hours at their current pay. This notion implies a sequential nature to 
the decision of the household. The story is that people first decide how much market work to 
do, then allocate the residual time to leisure and charitable time gifts. Since the amount of 
work is determined prior to the decision of leisure and time gifts, the opportunity cost of their 
time is no longer the after-tax wage. 
Another way that time can be accounted for is through agents receiving utility from 
the value of their time to the recipient (Andreoni, 1995). It is argued that "warm glow" 
altruists prefer to donate time where their marginal product is most highly valued and 
receives a larger glow when the recipient values their service more. For example, "if a 
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person can volunteer to do either a low-skilled job or a high-skilled job, we assume that the 
person would prefer to do the highly skilled job, because it is more valuable to the charity in 
the sense that the charity would have to pay a higher price to acquire the same service from 
the market" (Andreoni, 1995, p. 5). 
All previous studies of time and money donations have used the tax price of monetary 
gifts and the quantity of time to determine whether gifts of money and time are complements 
or substitutes. There may be error in making a conclusion of how the goods are related based 
on the tax price of monetary gifts. The models proposed in this dissertation and other papers 
assume a two-stage decision process for the consumer (Brown and Lankford, 1992). In the 
current context, people first decide their labor hours, then their private good purchases and, 
finally, their time spent on leisure and charitable time gifts. For each individual, his or her 
time donation is made in concert with the other members of the household. Therefore, 
appropriate econometric techniques must be used to account for the simultaneous decisions. 
Chapter five discusses how this issue is managed. 
In the case of charitable giving, there is good reason not to use the tax price for the 
estimation of the relationship among time and money. The simple tax price, p(l-t), of 
monetary contributions is negatively related to the level of monetary contributions for an 
itemizer. Larger monetary gifts lower an individual's tax rate, raising the tax price. In other 
words, the tax rate affects the tax price which affects the level of gifts which, in turn, affects 
the tax rate. This endogeneity bias has been addressed in the following ways. One way is to 
use the tax price applicable to the first dollar given rather than the last (Clotfelter, 1985, 
Slemrod, 1989). Another way suggested by Reece and Zieschang (1985), is to estimate 
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contributions using the entire schedule of tax rates which captures the fact that people face a 
non-linear budget constraint. Those methods are fine for addressing the endogeneity problem 
still exists a problem with using the tax price to determine the relationship between time and 
money gifts. As the tax rate falls, the tax price rises and monetary contributions fall, ceteris 
paribus. If money and time are complements, time will fall also. Due to the endogeneity 
problem, however, when the tax rate falls, disposable income rises. If money and time gifts 
are normal goods one would expect both to increase. This is not an income effect from a 
price change, this is a separate effect from the real change in disposable income due to the 
endogeneity bias (see Figure 1). Therefore, the idea that the relationship between time and 
monetary contributions can be gauged by the tax price is not satisfactory. 
for studies looking at only monetary contributions. Despite those types of corrections, there 
time gifts Itemizer 
t" < V A lower tax rate 
makes the budget 
line steeper, favoring 
time gifts. The new 
tax rate also creates 
more disposable 
income shifting the 
budget line out and 
E 
slope-1-t' leaving the effect on 
time and money 
ambiguous. 
E=24-sleep time 
y=disposable income=Y(1-t) 
t=margirial tax rate 
y' y" y' 
monetary gifts 
Figure 1. Effect of a lower tax rate 
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There is yet another reason not to use the tax price forjudging whether monetary and 
time gifts are substitutes or complements. Non-itemizers always face a simple tax price of 
one. Therefore, when looking at aggregate contributions of time and money, a change in the 
tax rate will only be viewed as a change in income for the non-itemizer (see Figure 2). This 
further distorts any systematic, predictable relation between the tax price of monetary gifts 
and the quantity of time given. 
The direct effects of changes in the tax price of monetary contributions on non-
itemizers are presumably zero. There may, however, be indirect effects generated by changes 
in the tax price. As discussed earlier, changes in tax rates directly affect disposable income, 
so that is not the issue raised here. The issue is the possibility of spillover effects from 
changes in the tax price. Here are two comments that support the possibility of this issue. 
time gifts Non-itemizer 
t" < t' 
E 
A lower tax rate 
will only 
increase a non-
itemizers 
disposable 
income. 
E=24-sleep time 
y=disposable income=Y(1-t) 
y* y" 
monetary gifts 
Figure 2. Effect of a lower tax rate on a Non-itemizer 
First, suppose a policy change favors itemizers of monetary gifts. A non-itemizer may view 
this as an increase in future or current tax liability and be induced to save, but instead of 
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reducing current consumption, the non-itemizer reduces monetary contributions. This 
implies a spillover effect to non-itemizers from a policy designed for itemizers. Another 
spillover effect could come from the supply side. Suppose that charities know about a policy 
change that will favor itemizers of monetary contributions. In response to the upcoming 
change, the charities increase advertising and fundraising expenditure. These expenditures 
will elicit contributions from non-itemizers as well. In order to justify this thought 
empirically, data would be needed from itemizers and non-itemizers. Then, total demand for 
charitable goods would be equal to the sum of the demands from itemizers and non-itemizers. 
The previous claim will be absolved by including the tax price in the non-itemizers demand. 
A negative relation between the tax price and non-itemizers contributions is expected if one 
believes a complementary relation exists between itemizer's and non-itemizer's gifts. The 
coefficient for the tax price variable measures the value of the spillover effect. It also will 
determine if the spillover effect is significant. One would expect, however, the non-
itemizer's demand to be less elastic than itemizer's demand. A study like this is important so 
that policy makers have appropriate insight to the impact of contribution tax reform. 
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CHAPTER 4. A HOUSEHOLD APPROACH TO CHARITABLE GIVING 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a household utility maximization problem. It 
will be shown that a household approach results in variables entering demand equations that 
would otherwise not be included under an individual approach. Later in the empirical section 
a nested test is used to determine which approach is more appropriate. Chapter 3 presented 
reasons to believe that a household solves its utility maximization problem in two stages. In 
the first stage, each household member chooses the number of hours to work, given the wage 
he/she is able to command for his/her skills. In the second stage, the household spends all of 
its monetary income on desired levels of private goods and monetary gifts. Each household 
member also chooses desired levels of leisure and time gifts according to the number of hours 
left after work and sleep. This two-stage process has not been modeled theoretically in the 
volunteer literature, although it has been modeled empirically (Brown and Lankford, 1992). 
It is easy to justify a two-stage decision process for a short-run analysis. In the short run, 
households are constrained by their choice of hours at work via an implicit or explicit 
contract. This is especially useful when a researcher is using cross-sectional data. One may 
argue that in the long run households choose work hours dependent upon the number of 
hours he/she wishes to volunteer rather than vice versa. I would argue that the two-stage 
process describes short and long run behavior for the average person. For the purposes of 
this work, however, the short run justification is sufficient. The two-stage process is 
addressed by using a separable utility function in four differentiated cases. In each case, 
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demand equations are derived. The separable utility function shows theoretically how a 
household's choice of volunteer time can be determined without prices, specifically the wage 
and the price of monetary gifts. It will also be shown how the household utility maximization 
problem can be modeled using a "full income" approach. 
Cooperating Spouses 
The model here differs from previous models by assuming that people receive double 
pleasure from giving time. A joint product is derived from the gift of time, a private warm 
glow from giving and the satisfaction from the total time given. Let gj be the private benefit 
agent i receives by giving time, aj is the benefit agent i receives from total time given, and t, is 
volunteer time by agent i. Th is volunteer time by household H and lj is leisure, w, is an 
individual's wage per hour net of tax, hi is labor hours, wjh,+w,hj is household earnings, p is 
the tax price of giving and Ej is agent i's available time for activities other than sleep. Let yj 
be a private good with its price normalized to 1, and m be the level of household monetary 
contributions, a and p are fixed proportion parameters that make it possible to test if a joint 
products model is appropriate. If a=0 and (5=1, then the pure public good model is observed. 
If a=l and (5=0, time is just a private good. If a=(3=l, then the "warm glow" model results. 
If a>0 and (5<1, then a joint products model is observed (Comes and Sandler, 1984). 
Let Uh be a well-behaved separable utility function for household H. Subscripts on 
variables and parameters in the utility function represent an individual family member, 
husband (i=l) and wife (i=2), 
UH=UH(yi ,y2,m,G[gi ,a, ,g2,a2,li,l2]). (24) 
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Let household h be constrained by: 
w i hi +w2h2=y i +y2+pm, 
TH=tl+t2, 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
gi=a,ti, i-1,2, 
aj=PjTH, i=l,2, 
Ej=hi+tj+lj, i—1,2, 
yi,m,tj,lj>0, Ml,2. 
Equation (25) is a standard budget constraint showing that the household will spend 
all of its earnings on private goods and monetary gifts. Equation (26) shows that the sum of 
each spouse's volunteer time creates total time given by the household. The private benefit 
that each agent receives from his or her volunteer time is expressed in equation (27). 
Equation (28) shows that total volunteer time by the household is a variable that may 
contribute to household utility by argument a,. Equation (29) restricts people to allocating 
their time over work, leisure and volunteer time. Equation (30) shows that none of the choice 
variables can be negative. 
There is no distinction made for monetary contributions among cooperating spouses. 
These contributions are purely public in the benefit that they confer to a household that pools 
member's income together. This is why there is no separation among spouses for monetary 
gifts. Time contributions, however, are separated by spouse due to the uniqueness of the gift. 
Total time given does still enter the utility function, but in a way that allows a joint product 
aspect to reveal itself. The wage rate is modeled as net of tax to reflect disposable income. 
The crowding effect of tax revenues used to purchase charitable goods is not modeled here 
directly. Since monetary gifts are separated in the utility function from time gifts, there is no 
issue of interrelated crowding effects. 
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The crowding of time gifts is quite different from monetary gifts, if it exists at all. 
The government does not have an endowment of time per se. Its time is drawn from 
employees or volunteers. A crowding story for time gifts would go like this. The 
government substitutes employees for volunteers by hiring people to do a job that has 
volunteers at it. The volunteers receive utility from the new workers through the overall level 
of the public good rising (T), but the volunteers lose their warm glow (g) because they are not 
contributing to the public good. If the worker's hours perfectly substitute for the volunteer's 
hours, the volunteer's utility will fall. This is due to the level of the public good remaining 
the same, but losing the private glow. Volunteers, however, can still consume their glow by 
volunteering at a less crowded venue. Therefore, as Kingma (1989) points out, the degree of 
crowding is sensitive to the availability of substitute goods. In general, it seems volunteers 
are always welcome. If they are turned away, they can easily give somewhere else. Also, it is 
unlikely that the government put employees into situations where there is already properly 
functioning volunteer effort. Therefore, concerns about crowding time gifts should be small. 
The assumption that households make decisions in a two-stage fashion, as previously 
described, implies a weakly separable utility function is being used. For purposes of 
explanation, allow there to be two branches to the utility function (Strotz, 1957). Let the 
portion of the utility function containing y,, y2, and m be called the income branch and the 
portion with G(e) be the time branch. The two branches are named to reflect the constraints 
that the consumer faces when making decisions for each branch. There are four variables in 
the time branch of the utility function: volunteer time by each spouse (t, and t2) and leisure 
consumed by each spouse (li and 12). Volunteer time by each spouse creates two products for 
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each spouse, aj and gj. Let G(gi,ai,g2,a2,li,l2) be the sub-utility function to be maximized. In 
other words, utility is dependent upon y,, y?, m, and G(e). 
UH=UH(yi ,y2,m,G[gi ,ai ,g2,a2,li,I2]) (31 ) 
The assumption of separability allows one to show the maximization of each branch 
separately. After making some substitutions of the constraints, the income branch of the 
household utility maximization problem can be represented as: 
Maximize UH(yi,w1hi+w2h2-yi-pm,m). (32) 
y I,m 
From this branch, the household determines the amount of private goods consumed and the 
level of monetary gifts. Recall that income is solved in the first stage in which hours worked 
are determined. All money income is spent in the income branch, so that the only constraint 
that the consumer faces in the time branch is a time constraint; 
Ej=hj+lj+tj i=l,2, (33) 
where hj is fixed. This constraint is substituted into (31) replacing leisure. The time branch 
of the maximization problem is: 
Maximize G[aiti ,(31 (tj-+-t2),a2t2,p2(ti+t2),E i-h| -t| ,E2-h2-t2], (34) 
where hours worked by each spouse (h, and h2) have been determined in the first stage and E, 
is exogenous. The assumption of a separable utility function implies that the marginal rates 
of substitution between the elements of G(*) are independent of the non-G(') elements. The 
usual comment made about weak separability is that consumers partition their income 
between the two branches and there is no substitution effect among goods in each branch for 
relative price changes among branches. There still exists, however, an income effect that 
may have implications on the other branch. The effect is through changes in hours worked. 
Any price change that causes hours worked to change causes there to be more or less time for 
leisure and/or time gifts. 
The marginal utilities derived from G(e) for t,>0 and t2>0 are: 
dG/dt,=G'a,+G^i+G^2-G'=0, (35) 
dG/dt2=G^,+G^a2+G^2-G^=0, (36) 
where G1 = 3G/5(a,t, ), 
G " = g G / 6 ( P , ( t , + t 2 ) ) ,  
G3 = 3G/ d(a2t2), 
G " = 6 G / a ( P 2 ( t , + t 2 ) ) ,  
G5 =5G/5(E, -h, -t.), 
G ^ = a G / g ( E 2 - h z - t 2 ) .  
The first order conditions for corner solutions are straight forward. For t,>0 and t2=0, 
equation (35) will stand alone. For t,=0 and t2>0, equation (36) will stand alone. For t|=0 
and t2=0, both vanish. A convenient way to represent the first order conditions is to keep 
them separate. Equation (38) shows the result of rearranging (35) by dividing the left and 
right side of the equation by G5. 
z~^2 
1 = a
'^? + l3l^J + P2^J (37) 
=> 1 = a, MRSg.i, + ZPj MRS„„ (38) 
i=l 
Equation (39) shows the result of rearranging (36) the same way (35) is done. 
=>l = a2MRSg2,2+EPjMRSaj,2 (39) 
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Equations (38) and (39) show that consumers choice of time gifts and leisure is a weighted 
average of the marginal rates of substitution of their glow for leisure, their public good 
benefits for leisure and their spouse's public good benefits for leisure. These equations will 
be useful for comparison with a model in which the household aspect is not present. 
Since one or both spouses may not contribute time, it is important to allow for the 
possibility of t,=0. Ransom (1987) discussed a similar situation, but he looked at the joint 
labor supply of a couple allowing one spouse to choose non-market work. The idea is that 
some households may receive higher utility by doing something other than contributing time. 
When this is the case, dG/dt, and/or dG/dt] will be less than or equal to zero. This means 
that household utility may fall if the spouse for whom the inequality holds gives time. 
Demand equations from the second stage take the form of: 
_Jti(hi,h2,E1,E2;a],p1,P2) t,>0 
t | = j o  othenv.se <40) 
. J*2 01! >h2 ,E, ,E2 ;a2, Pt, P2 ) t2>0 t 2 = i n  ( 4 i )  [0 otherwise 
The demand equations capture the idea of each spouse taking the other spouse's residual time 
into account. This interaction of the spouse's decisions is complemented by hours worked 
serving as a proxy to each spouse's opportunity cost. The interdependence of the spouse's 
decisions will be captured by a correlation coefficient. These demand equations will be 
estimated using a bivariate tobit model since the two demand equations are solved 
simultaneously. The econometrics applied to these demand equations are explained in 
greater detail in chapter 5. 
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Non-Cooperating Spouses 
The model to be presented next is called the model of non-cooperating spouses. It 
differs from the previous model by assuming that each spouse spends only his/her earnings 
rather than pooling the earnings together. Each spouse however can still receive some extra 
utility when the other spouse gives time. Let y, be a private good with a price normalized to 
1. mi is the level of monetary contributions. Let gj be the private benefit that agent i receives 
by giving time; aj is the benefit agent i receives from total time given by the household; tj is 
volunteer time by agent i; t(j) is his/her spouse's time donations. TH is total volunteer time by 
household H, 1; is leisure, Wj is the net of tax wage, hj is hours worked, Wjh, is net earnings, p 
is the tax price of giving, and Ej is each agent's available time for activities other than sleep. 
otj and Pi are fixed proportion parameters that make it possible to test if a joint products 
model is appropriate. Let Uj be a well-behaved separable utility function for individual i. As 
in the cooperating spouse model, the portion of the utility function with y; and mi is called the 
income branch and the portion with G(e) is called the time branch. Agent i's utility function, 
Uj=Uj(yj,mj,G[gi,ai,lj]), (42) 
is constrained by: 
Wjhryj+pmj, (43) 
Th=tj+t(j), (44) 
gi=Oitj , (45) 
a,—PiTn, (46) 
Ej=hj+tj+lj, (47) 
yj,mj,tj,lj>0. (48) 
Equation (43) is a standard budget constraint showing that an individual will spend all of his 
or her earnings on private goods and monetary gifts. Total household hours are determined 
by the sum of each spouse's hours, equation (44). Equation (45) shows each spouse's private 
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benefit from his or her volunteer time. Equation (46) is present to recognize that total time 
given is a variable that may contribute to an individual's utility. Equation (47) restricts 
individuals to allocating their time among total time they are endowed. The non-negative 
constraints are in (48). With substitutions of the constraints, the individual's utility 
maximization problem reduces to: 
Maximize Ul(Wihi-pmi,mi,G[alt,,Pi(ti+t(i)),El-h,-tl]). (49) 
mj,tj 
Based on the assumption that the individual makes decisions in a two-stage fashion as 
previously described, hj is determined in the first stage. The separability assumption allows 
one to solve for the utility maximizing levels of tj and lj by maximizing the function G(') in 
the time branch with choice variable tj. Therefore, the time branch of the utility 
maximization problem presents itself as: 
Maximize G(ajtj,pj(tj+t(j)),E-hj-tj). (50) 
tj 
The marginal utility function derived from (50) is: 
dG/dt|=G'a,+G-p,-G=0. (51) 
The first order condition for the second stage of this optimization problem is a weighted 
average of agents' willingness to substitute their own time with leisure and other's time with 
their leisure. Equation (53) shows the results of rearranging (51). 
l = + (52) 
= > l  =  aiMRSg,,, + P,MRS„„ (53) 
The idea is that a people's choices of time gifts and leisure will depend on how they 
weight their personal gain (a) from their own contribution of time and their gain (p) from 
knowing that they along with others contributed to the task at hand. Contrast equation (53) 
with equation (38). In so doing, one observes the inefficiency of the non-cooperating 
spouses. Each spouse does not take into account that his or her choice of time influences the 
other's utility through p. The demand equation generated from this model is: 
Most models have a utility function similar to the non-cooperating spouse model. 
The implication of this scenario is that the estimated demand will be understated and less 
efficient. If the household model is a better representation of the real world, then one will 
find the estimated demand for household time gifts greater than the sum of the demands from 
non-cooperating spouses. This is due to the household model recognizing that each spouse 
will consider the other spouse's welfare in his/her choice of time. 
A "Full-Income" Approach 
Another hypothesis to test is whether the joint products model is appropriate. The 
utility function is structured to allow volunteer time to create two goods, a private and public 
component to consumption. Two tests will be performed. One will test the pure public 
model versus the joint products model. The other test will be for a private good model versus 
the joint products model. Each independent test is performed to show that regardless of the 
specification, volunteer time creates a joint product in consumption. In order to test whether 
t j  ( t ( i ) , h i  , E j  ;  a f ,  P i  )  
0 otherwise 
t ,  > 0  
(54) 
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the joint products model is preferred to the pure public model, a "full-income" approach is 
used. The basic idea of a full-income approach is to directly incorporate an externality into 
the income constraint. For example, suppose that there exists a spillover effect for individual 
i with income Ij. The spillover effect can be added to each side of the budget constraint 
creating full-income, Ij*=Tj+spill(j), where spill^ is the value of the external effect (Comes 
and Sandler, 1996). 
In this case, recall that there is no money spent in the time branch, therefore, full-
income takes on a new meaning. A full-income approach is accomplished by adding one 
spouse's time to each side of the other's time constraint, equation (47). Now using (44) we 
have a "full-time" constraint: 
Ej+t(i)=hj+TH+li. (55) 
Let Ej*=Ej+t(j), 
Ej*=hj+TH+li. (56) 
The effects of E* on the non-cooperating spouse model will first be examined, then 
E* will be applied to the cooperating spouse model. The G(«) function has not changed 
except for a substitution of tj. Using (56), (50) becomes: 
G(aj(TH-t(j)),PjTH,Ej*-hj-TH). (57) 
Now the consumer is choosing TH rather than tj. By maximizing G(*) with respect to TH, one 
finds the following demand function: 
TH=TH(t(i),hj,E*). (58) 
If we treat TH as a pure public good, then G(*) becomes: 
G(TH,Ej*-hrTH) (59) 
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and the resulting demand function is: 
TH=TH(hj,Ej*). (60) 
Equation (60) is nested in equation (58) and therefore a likelihood ratio test can be used to 
determine if the household creates a joint product from volunteer time. Simultaneous 
equation techniques must be employed because t(j) is determined in concert with tj. In 
addition to simultaneity, decisions of tj are censored at zero, therefore a bivariate tobit model 
will be used for estimation of the parameters. A two-stage tobit process is presented in 
chapter 5 to show the significance of the joint products specification. 
The joint products model can also be tested against a private good specification. A 
model without joint products and tj a private good would bear a demand equation, 
The demand equation for the joint products model was derived earlier and rewritten here: 
Since equation (61) is nested in (62), a likelihood ratio test can determine the appropriateness 
of the joint products model. Once again t(j> is chosen in concert with tj, so simultaneous 
equation estimation will produce a correlation coefficient that will capture correlated, 
unpredictable noise in the error term of each equation. 
Now let us consider the effects of E* on the cooperating spouses model. The 
household's second stage maximization problem (34) now looks like this: 
tj=tj(hj,Ej). (61) 
tj=tj(t(l),hj,E1). (62) 
Maximize G[otiti,PiTH,a2(TH-ti),p2TH,E,-h, -t, ,E2*-h2-TH]. 
ti,Tn 
(63) 
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Note that the household's choice variables are now t, and Th instead of t, and t2. The 
full-time convention is used so that marginal effects and interdependences among the 
variables can be shown at the household level. The marginal utilities derived from G(e) are: 
dG/dti=G'a,-G^2-G^+G^=0 (64) 
dG/dTH=G2(3,+G3a2+G4p2-G6=0. (65) 
The first order conditions for the full-time model, (64) and (65), are equivalent to the first 
order conditions without full-time, equations (35) and (36). 1 By presenting the consumer's 
problem in the full-time model, one is able to test the impact of the independent variables on 
individual and household consumption simultaneously. In the empirical section, these two 
demand equations will be estimated simultaneously using a bivariate tobit model. Demand 
equations from the second stage take the form of: 
,  _ J * ! ( h ] > h 2 , E , , E 2 * ; a , , p , , P 2 )  
' " j o  
; T H ( h „ h 2 , E , , E / ; a „ p , , P 2 )  Mo 
1 The following short proof is included to verify the equivalence of the two sets of first order 
conditions. Since (65) is the same as (36), one can see what conditions must be true for (64) 
to be equal to (35). Therefore, set (35) equal to (64), 
G'a,+G^p,+G^p2-G^ G'a,-G3a2-GW\ (a) 
Rearranging (a) and canceling terms reveals, 
G2p,+G3a2+G%-G"=0. (b) 
(b) is (65)/. 
otherwise 
otherwise 
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Non-Cooperating Spouses Considering Others' Time 
Another model to test is essentially the same as the previous model. It differs by 
adding a third group to the collective. This model is not tested empirically in the dissertation, 
but is provided to show how the theoretical model can be adapted to consider more detail. 
The idea is that a person can also get benefits of camaraderie from people other than one's 
spouse participating in the volunteer work. For example, suppose a person named Roger 
does volunteer work for a blood drive at his church. He can enjoy utility in a few different 
ways. One way is that he has contributed to the overall supply of blood in the county. 
Another way is that he enjoyed the act of giving, a "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1990). Another 
way is that he enjoyed the camaraderie of the other church members he was with while giving 
time. Thus, the consumer receives utility from his volunteer time, his spouse's volunteer 
time and all other's gift of time. Let yj be a private good and its price be normalized to 1. iUj 
is the level of monetary contributions, tjeTH<=Ta is volunteer time by agent i, TncTa is some 
subgroup of contributors time including agent i (possibly husband and wife), t,cTH represents 
a friend's time (possibly the spouse of agent i), t0cTa is all others' time donations, Ta is the 
total level of time donations, Cj=yjTa is agent i's benefit from the total of all time donations, lj 
is leisure, Wj is the net of tax wage, hi is hours worked, Wjhj is net earnings, p is the tax price 
of giving and Ej is the agent's available time for activities other than sleep, a, P and y are 
fixed proportion parameters. If y=0, then other agent's gifts do not have a separate influence 
on individual i's utility and the model collapses down to the model of non-cooperating 
spouses. There may still exist an effect through p, however. The model is an extension of 
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the model of non-cooperating spouses. Let U, be a well-behaved utility function for 
individual i, 
Uj=Ui(yj,nij,G[gj,aj,Cj,lj]) i=l,...,n. (68) 
hidividual i is constrained by: 
wihi=yi+pmi, (69) 
Ta=TH+to, (70) 
gj==0Cjti , (71) 
ai=piTH, (72) 
Ci=YiTa, (73) 
Tn-tj+tf, (74) 
E=hj+tj+lj, (75) 
yi,mi,ti,l,>0. (76) 
Equations (69) - (76) have the same meanings as the constraints in the previous non-
cooperating spouse model. The only difference is the addition of (73) which allows the 
individual to receive utility through all time contributed to the public good. Similar to 
before, the combination of the marginal rate of substitutions are shown in equation (78). 
l = + + (77) 
=> 1 = cti MRSgjlj + Pj MRSajlj + Yj MRScjij i=l...n (78) 
The idea is that peoples' choice of time and leisure will depend on three elements. The first 
is how they weight their own personal gain (a) from their contribution of time. The second is 
their gain (P) from the household's contribution to the public good. Finally, their gain (y) 
from knowing they, along with others, contributed to the task at hand. The demand equation 
generated from this model is: 
j t i ( t f , t 0 , h i , E i ; a i , p i )  t ,  > 0  
Mo othenvise <?9) 
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A nested test is made possible by the form of the demand equation if t0 is predetermined or 
exogenous. Equation (62) is nested in the non-cooperating spouse's demand equation (79) 
making it possible to test the significance of other's time through a likelihood ratio test (t(j> 
from (62) is tt- in equation (79)). If t0 is endogenous and censored, a simultaneous tobit model 
is required to estimate the parameters. 
Cooperating Spouses Considering of Others' time 
The cooperating spouse model can also be modified to include all others' time. The 
"full-time" convention can be applied to any of the models in this paper. For simplicity I 
have not included the "full-time" transformation in the following. Revising the utility 
function found in equation (24): 
UH=UH(yi ,y2,m,G[gi ,ai ,c, ,g2,a2,c2,1, ,12]). (80) 
Household H is constrained by: 
wihi+w2h2=yi+y2+pm, 
Ta=TH+to, 
TH=ti+t2, 
gi=ajtj, 
ai=pjTH, 
Ci=YiTa, 
Ej=hj+tj+lj, 
=1,2, 
=1,2 
=1,2 
=1,2 
yi,m,ti,lj>0, i=l,2. 
(81) 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
(86) 
(87) 
(88) 
Equation (81) is a standard budget constraint for the household. Equations (82)-(88) have the 
same interpretation as the constraints previously presented in the model of non-cooperating 
spouses. The only change to the time branch of the utility function, G(*), is that it now has 
the gamma terms, Yi(ti+t2+t0): 
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G=G(a,t1,(3i(ti+t2),Yi(ti+t2+to),a2t2,(32(ti+t2),y2(t!+t2+to),El-h,-t,,E2-h2-t2). (89) 
Shown in equations (90) and (91) are the first order conditions that now contain an additional 
sum term capturing the effect of others' time. 
2 2 
1 = ai MRSg,i, + ZPj MRSaji, + X Yj MRS, 
i=l i=l c  j 11  
(90) 
1 = ai MRSg2i2 + Ê Pj MRSa j i 2  + É  Yj MRSC 
i=i i=l 'cjl2 
In the demand equations a new variable, t0, reveals itself: 
f t  i ( to ' h i ,h2 ,E I ,E 2 ; c t 1 ,P 1 , p 2 )  
' H o  
* 2  =  
[ t 2( t o 'h 1 , h2 ,E 1 ,E 2 ; a2 ,p | ,P 2 )  
|0 
t, > 0 
otherwise 
t2 > 0 
otherwise 
(91) 
(92) 
(93) 
Since equation (40) and (41) are nested in equation (92) and (93) respectively, a likelihood 
ratio test can be used to determine whether the addition of other people's time is appropriate 
when t0 is predetermined or exogenous. If t0 is censored and endogenous with ti and t2, a 
simultaneous tobit specification must be used for estimation. The presentation of this model 
is here to show how the theoretical framework can be expanded and is not tested empirically. 
The next chapter will address how these models will be tested taking into account the 
simultaneous nature of the decision process for the household. 
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CHAPTER 5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ECONOMETRICS 
Description of the Data 
This study uses data from the American Participation Study of 1990. The data is 
distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and 
produced by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). The interviews were done in 
person and usually lasted two hours. The sample is representative of non-institutionalized 
adults 18 years of age or older living in the United States. There were 2,517 people in the 
sample. They were asked questions regarding their donations of time and money to various 
types of organizations, including political, religious, and community involvement. Other 
demographic variables of interest include household income, job type, age, number of family 
members, and education. After shedding observations with missing or conflicting data, I am 
left with a sample of 2,232 households with 1265 of them being married. 
The data show that 64% of households contributed money to religious organizations, 
while 32% contributed time. By taking the total amount of monetary gifts given to religious 
organizations and dividing it by the number of donors, I compute the average annual gift of 
$785 per household. The sample is close to evenly split between households with and 
without children, 49% of the households have children (of which 37% had children under age 
five). The distribution of race is 66% white, 19% black, 1% Asian, 1% Alaskan native, 12% 
Hispanic/Latino, 1% other. Approximately 70% of the respondents graduated from high 
school, 54% attended college, 33% earned at least an Associates Degree and 1.5% earned a 
Ph.D. 
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Approximately 58% of the respondents worked full-time while 10% worked part-
time. About 13% of the people considered themselves to be housekeepers, 9% retired, and 
10% other. Of the people who chose to work, 14% was self-employed. 
32% 
0 full-time 
• part-time 
• other 
Figure 3. Respondent's labor decisions 
The data reveals that 60% of the respondents was married. From the group of married 
persons, people who are married, 63% had spouses working full-time and 10% had them 
working part-time. By looking at the education level of a person's spouse, one finds that 
86% married someone with at least a high school diploma. 
Approximately 60% of the respondents attended a religious service at least once a 
month, and 34% claimed that they attended at least once a week. The data show that 42% of 
people who attended church also did volunteer work for the church. This means that a 
greater percent chose not to volunteer, and this is why a tobit model is needed for estimation. 
The numbers also reveal that 94% of people who attended church also gave money to church. 
The average gift among attendees was approximately $577.43 (see Appendix, Table 1-A). 
The average gift among givers was $815.83. Nearly 48% of people who attended church 
gave time in ways other than attending services. The average amount of volunteer time per 
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week was 2.09 hours (see Appendix, Table 2-A). Since this research is concerned about the 
household, Tables 3-A, 4-A, and 5-A of the Appendix are included to get a general feel for 
the variables involved. Table 3-A shows statistics for all households. Statistics for married 
couples are found in Table 4-A and single respondent's statistics are found in Table 5-A. The 
variables' descriptions are found in Table 1 of this chapter. 
Econometric Specification 
A tobit model is the most common way to approach censored data like charitable 
gifts. Many people choose not to give time, approximately 33% from the data used here. 
This creates a lower bound of zero for the quantity of gifts. In each of the econometric 
models, the number of non-zero observations for the dependent variables are listed as non-
limit observations. There are two ways in which a tobit model is used in this paper. When 
evaluating total gifts of time by the household, I used a standard tobit model. When 
evaluating time gifts that are determined simultaneously, I used a bivariate tobit model. The 
following econometric specification corresponds to the theoretical variables described earlier. 
The standard tobit model is used to estimate total time given for the household. Let tj* be an 
index function: 
ti* = (3'Xi + Sj, (94) 
tj=0, if tj* < 0 (95) 
if tj* > 0 (96) 
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where P=(Po,Pi,. • -Pn) ,  xj=(x0,xi,.. .xn) and Sj is a normally distributed random error term. 
With O as a cumulative density function and (pas a probability density function, the tobit 
specification has the following structure: 
E[tj|x;]=0(p'x,/a)(p'xi + a)Lj), (97) 
where = (p(P'Xj/cr) / 0(P'Xj/a). 
The marginal effects for the model are: 
<9E[tj*|Xj]/0Xj = p. 
(98) 
(99) 
The log likelihood function takes the form: 
InL = £-2 
tj >0 
ln(2;r) + In a2 + ( t i -A , ) '  
(7~ 
',=0 
1 - CD 'A"  
y <J j (100) 
Throughout the theory section there is foreshadowing of hypothesis tests to be 
performed. Many of these take the form of nested tests in which a variable enters one 
demand equation and not another. Likelihood ratio tests will be used to identify the 
significance of these variables. 
The bivariate tobit model is used to estimate the simultaneous choice made by 
households of time gifts to church and non-church activities. It is also used to show the 
simultaneous decision of total hours given by each spouse. The equations estimated 
simultaneously are: 
t, = pi'x+e,, (101) 
t2  =  Pz 'x+E2 ,  (102)  
where 
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E[s]=0, for e=[£i,s2], (103) 
E[ee'] = V 
Each equation is a standard tobit model. The difference is that the disturbances are jointly 
normally distributed with variances cr,, and a22 and covariance a,2=rho. Joint estimation will 
result in efficiency gains provided the correlation coefficient, rho, is nonzero. The statistical 
software used for the calculations is LIMDEP, version 7.0. 
Interpretation of Data 
Joint Products and Full-Time 
This section shows how the full-time joint products model can be applied to 
households' choices of volunteer time. There are seven econometric models presented in this 
section. The first one is the primary contribution made to the volunteer literature from this 
dissertation. The other six models, following the first, show a progression of results that 
leads one to the full-time joint products model. There are hypothesis tests presented for each 
of the six models that show the full-time joint products model is best representation for 
modeling household volunteer time. 
Before addressing the specification of the full-time joint products model, it will be 
useful to examine the various ways the dependent variables can be presented. Figure 4 shows 
how the dependent variables can be combined for different types of analysis. The big circle 
represents total hours donated by the household to all kinds of activities (HTOTANHR). The 
smaller ovals show two things. The horizontal ovals show how total household hours can be 
011 On CT12Û12 
021O21 022O22 
(104) 
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broken down into each spouse's gifts (DADTOT and MOMTOT). The vertical ovals show 
how total household hours can be broken down into hours given to church (HCSHOURS) 
and hours given to all other activities (HSTIME). Finally, the small circles show each 
spouse's gifts of time to each kind of activity. Other statistics, such as the mean of the 
variables, are shown in Tables 3-A, 4-A, and 5-A of the Appendix. 
HTOTANHR 
HSTIME HCSHOURS 
DADTOT 
OGANNHR CSHOURS 
MOMTOT 
SPTIME SCSHOURS 
Figure 4. Various relationships among dependent variables 
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
CSHOURS 
DADEDUC 
DADTOT 
FITDAD 
FITMOM 
FULLHATD 
FULLHATM 
FULLTIME 
HCSHOURS 
HEDUC 
HRTOTH 
HRTOTD 
HRTOTM 
HSTIME 
HTOTANHR 
HTOTHATD 
HTOTHATM 
KIDS 
MOMTOT 
MOMEDUC 
OGANNHR 
OVER62 
RLMEMB 
SCSHOURS 
SPTIME 
YRBORN 
Dad's volunteer time per year at his or her church aside from attending services 
Dad's education equals 1 if greater than a high school diploma. 0 otherwise. 
Dad's total volunteer time per year 
Predicted value of DADTOT 
Predicted value of MOMTOT 
HRTOTH plus FITMOM 
HRTOTH plus FITDAD 
'Full-time' for the household, HRTOTH plus FITDAD 
Household's volunteer time per year given to their church aside from attending services 
Household's level of education found by the sum of DADEDUC and MOMEDUC 
HRTOTD plus HRTOTM 
Total hours in a year less Dad's sleep time and hours of work 
Total hours in a year less Mom's sleep time and hours of work 
Household's volunteer time per year given to various organizations other than a church 
Household's total volunteer time given per year, DADTOT plus MOMTOT 
DADTOT plus FITMOM 
MOMTOT plus FITDAD 
Equals 1 if household has at least one child living at home, otherwise equals 0 
Mom's total volunteer time per year 
Mom's education equals 1 if greater than a high school diploma, 0 otherwise. 
Dad's volunteer time per year to various organizations other than a church 
Age of respondent if age is greater than 62, 0 otherwise 
Member of, or belong to a church, synagogue or other religious institution, member equals 1, 
otherwise equals 0 
Mom's volunteer time per year given to his or her church aside from attending services 
Mom's volunteer time to various organizations other than church 
Age of respondent if age is less than or equal to 62, 0 otherwise 
The descriptions of the variables used in this study are found in table 1. The demand 
equations for the full-time joint products model for cooperating spouses are inseparable for 
household members making decisions simultaneously. Restated below are the demand 
equations from chapter 4: 
* i  -
ft1(h1,h2,E1,E2*;a1,(3],32) 
l o  
t, > 0 
otherwise 
(105) 
[TH (h i ,h 2 ,E 1 ,E 2 * ;a 1 , p i , p2 )  
l o  
TH >0 
otherwise 
(106) 
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In using the full-time convention it is necessary to use simultaneous equation 
techniques, because interdependences among spouses are revealed through each spouse's 
time in the demand equations. The following equations show total household hours and one 
spouse's time linearly dependent on various demographic variables and full-time. The public 
good aspect of the model reveals itself through the significance of the full-time variable, 
FULLTIME (E*, as discussed in the theory section). Taste parameters are added to the 
empirical model to capture various effects of household characteristics. Age, presence of 
kids, church membership and education variables were added as taste parameters. Health 
status is a variable in which this data set has no information on. It is a variable that I expect 
has a positive relationship with volunteering. The age variable may be picking up some of 
this effect. Age is modeled with a break at age 62. In early models without a spline, the age 
coefficient was significantly negative. Adding a spline uncovered a positive relation for 
younger people and a negative relation for older people in respect to their volunteering with 
aging. Except for the taste parameters, this system of equations follows directly from the 
theory work in chapter four, equations (66) and (67). 
DADTOT=ao+a1YRBORN+a2OVER62+a3KIDS+a4RLMEMB+a5DADEDUC 
+a()FULLTIME +e. ( 107) 
HTOTANHR=p0+PiYRBORN+p2OVER62+p3KIDS+p4RLMEMB+p5MOMEDUC 
+p()FULLTIME +e. (108) 
The variables in table 2 follow from the theory developed in chapter 4. The alpha and beta 
coefficients provide empirical measures of the variables, they are not the productivity 
parameters presented in the theory section. The key aspects of this work that separate it from 
others is the use of full-time (FULLTIME) and the use of a bivariate tobit model yielding the 
correlation coefficient RHO. Table 2 shows the results of using a bivariate tobit model to 
simultaneously estimate total individual volunteer time (DADTOT) and total household 
annual hours of volunteer time (HTOTANHR). The following comments will describe the 
results in table 2 and provide the logic that went into the development of the structure. 
Table 2. Cooperating Spouses with "Full-Time" 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
DADTOT 
Constant -307.7815 83.8425 -3.6710 0.0002 
YRBORN 4.2482 1.3438 3.1610 0.0016 
OVER62 -20.7273 6.2966 -3.2920 0.0010 
KIDS 11.5351 32.2033 0.3580 0.7202 
RLMEMB 214.5673 28.2130 7.6050 0.0001 
DADEDUC 2.1766 7.7265 0.2820 0.7782 
FULLTIME 0.0199 0.0086 2.3050 0.0212 
HTOTANHR 
Constant -577.0069 160.3334 -3.5990 0.0003 
YRBORN 8.1473 2.5406 3.2070 0.0013 
OVER62 -39.2549 12.0837 -3.2490 0.0012 
KIDS -1.5417 59.9456 -0.0260 0.9795 
RLMEMB 408.0211 54.0001 7.5560 0.0001 
HEDUC 11.9685 8.9928 1.3310 0.1832 
FULLTIME 0.0390 0.0172 2.2640 0.0236 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 434.4898 5.9474 73.0550 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 826.8874 12.2842 67.3130 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9870 0.0005 1950.5270 0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations forDADTOT 903.00 
Non-limit observations for HTOTANHR 959.00 
Value of Log likelihood function 
-13234.18 
Beginning with the five demographic variables, an interpretation is provided for each 
coefficient in the DADTOT equation. The age of the respondent is modeled with a structural 
break at age 62. This is done to see if volunteer behavior changes around retirement age. 
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This may also reflect how health affects volunteer effort since there was not a variable in the 
survey to proxy health. The age coefficient, YRBORN shows that for each additional year a 
person ages before 62, total time gifts increase approximately 4.25 hours per year. 
Volunteering decreases dramatically when people are over age 62. For each additional year 
of age over 62, volunteering falls 20.72 hours per year. The coefficient for KIDS is 
insignificant showing that the presence of children does not influence volunteering. The 
church membership coefficient, RLMEMB, demonstrates that on average church members 
give 215 more total hours per year than non-members. People with an education level greater 
than a high school diploma have an insignificant difference in total hours given compared 
with people who have at most a high school diploma. The coefficient for FULLTIME shows 
that for each additional hour available to an individual, he or she tends to increase volunteer 
time by 1.19 minutes (.019*60 minutes). 
An interpretation of the coefficients for the HTOTANHR equation is presented next. 
The HTOTANHR equation's coefficients provide the marginal effects for the household as 
well as the other spouse. The coefficient for AGE shows that a household tends to increase 
total annual hours given by 8.15 hours per year for each additional year of age before 62. 
After age 62, volunteer hours by the household fall by 39.25 hours per year. The youngest 
respondent was 19, the oldest was 89, and the average age was 43. Households with children 
did not show significantly different hours due to children in the household as indicated by the 
insignificant coefficient for KIDS. Membership in a church by a household, RLMEMB, 
leads to 408 hours more volunteering per year than those households that do not belong to a 
church. Recall that HTOTANHR includes both volunteering for church and non-church 
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activities. The coefficient for HEDUC shows that education level of the household is not 
significant to a household's decision of total time to give. An important variable for the 
decision of volunteer time by the household is full-time. For every additional hour of full-
time available to the household, the household increases volunteer time by 2.34 (.039*60 
minutes) minutes per year. 
By comparing coefficients for the same variable across equations, one can see 
importance of using simultaneous equation techniques. For example, the difference between 
the YRBORN coefficients in the two equations shows that one cannot assume a coefficient 
for the spouse's equation can be doubled to analyze the household. The effect of age on the 
household is less than double the effect on an individual respondent. 
The final parameter to evaluate is important for this work, RHO. Rlio is significant 
and positive indicating that the bivariate tobit model is an appropriate way to model the 
interdependences of household volunteer time. A value of rho=.987 suggests that the error 
terms of the spouses are highly correlated. This means that unobserved things that effect one 
spouse's decision of volunteer time also affect the other spouse in the same way. It is 
especially important to estimate rho when the correlation among the dependent variables is 
high. 
Now that the primary model of volunteering has been presented, the supporting 
models are explored. There is a specific purpose for each of the six supporting models, a 
hypothesis is tested in each one. The results of the hypothesis test will be explained, but 
there will be no discussion of the individual coefficients of the model. 
The demand equation generated from the non-cooperating spouse model without full­
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time is tested empirically in this section. The specification of this model is shown in 
equations (109) and (110) and follows directly from the theoretical specification for non-
cooperating spouses, equation (54). 
DADTOT=ao+aiYRBORN+a2OVER62+a3KIDS+a4RLMEMB+a5DADEDUC 
+a6HRTOTD +e. (109) 
MOMTOT=Po+PiYRBORN+p2OVER62+p3KIDS+P4RLMEMB+P5MOMEDUC 
+P&HRTOTM +6. (110) 
The focus of this model is on the coefficients of the non-cooperating spouse's available time, 
a6 and p6. Rho is also important in that if rho is positive and significant, then the spouses' 
decisions of volunteer time are affected the same way from unobserved, random disturbances. 
The utility function generates a demand equation with one spouse's time as an argument of 
the other spouse's volunteer time. Because one spouse's time is determined simultaneously 
with the other spouse's time, one must test this interdependence with a bivariate tobit model. 
The demographic variables are the same as those found in the model of table 2. The only 
difference is that available time for each spouse is used instead of full-time for estimation of 
his or her total hours given individually. Table 3 shows the results of testing the non-
cooperating spouse model. The coefficients for available time are insignificant, but rho is .94 
and significant. 
It is a surprise to find available time insignificant. It may be that spouses behave in a 
cooperating way, or that there are omitted variables. Another possibility is that the RHS 
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variables that the spouses share cause too much noise. In an attempt to simplify the problem, 
equations (111) and (112) present demand equations for non-cooperating spouses without the 
shared variables. 
DADTOT=a0+a, D ADEDUC+a2HRT OTD+e. (Ill) 
MOMTOT=p0+piMOMEDUC+p2HRTOTM+£. (112) 
Table 4 shows the results of a bivariate tobit model testing the demand equations in 
(111) and (112). Note that rho remains significant and virtually the same in magnitude. 
Recall from the theory section that since DADTOT and MOMTOT are chosen in concert, one 
must test for simultaneity through rho. The following null and alternative hypothesis define 
the test: 
H0: rho=0 
Ha: rho^O. 
Since the prob-value for rho is .0001, we must reject the null hypothesis at the highest level. 
The value of rho=.944 implies that the error terms of the two spouses are highly correlated. 
The coefficient for Dad's available time is still insignificant and Mom's available time is 
significant at a 6% level. The cooperating spouse model will be tested next. 
The difference between the cooperating and non-cooperating spouse models is that 
each spouse's available time appears in the demand equation for each spouse in the 
cooperating spouse model. The non-cooperating spouse model has only available time of 
agent i as an argument for agent i's demand for time gifts (see equations (109) and (110)). 
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Table 3. Non-Cooperating Spouses 
Variable 
DADTOT 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
DADEDUC 
HRTOTD 
MOMTOT 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
MOMEDUC 
HRTOTM 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 
Sigma(2) 
RHO(l,2) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-229.2212 
4.9324 
-19.4829 
2.9053 
221.5183 
-4.7870 
0.0051 
-229.7058 
4.8496 
-17.9519 
-20.9004 
212.3376 
15.1630 
0.0061 
442.5066 
419.2186 
0.9406 
73.2757 
1.3571 
6.3208 
32.5675 
28.9139 
11.0459 
0.0068 
65.7192 
1.2697 
6.0324 
29.3930 
27.3893 
9.8044 
0.0051 
6.0163 
6.8343 
0.0024 
CoefUSE 
-3.1280 
3.6340 
-3.0820 
0.0890 
7.6610 
-0.4330 
0.7480 
-3.4950 
3.8200 
-2.9760 
-0.7110 
7.7530 
1.5470 
1.2040 
73.5510 
61.3410 
390.2050 
Prob. Value 
0.0018 
0.0003 
0.0021 
0.9289 
0.0001 
0.6647 
0.4545 
0.0005 
0.0001 
0.0029 
0.4770 
0.0001 
0.1220 
0.2285 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
Observations 
Non-limit observations for DADTOT 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 
Value of Log likelihood function 
1265.00 
903.00 
872.00 
-12827.05 
Therefore, the non-cooperating spouse's demand is nested in the cooperating spouse's 
demand. Except for the taste parameter, education, equations (113) and (114) are directly 
related to the cooperating spouse demand equations (40) and (41) from the theory chapter. 
The cooperating spouse model is presented below: 
DADTOT=a0+aiDADEDUC+a2HRTOTD+a3HRTOTM+8, (113) 
MOMTOT=po+p,MOMEDUC+p2HRTOTM+p3HRTOTD+8. (114) 
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Table 4. Non-Cooperating Spouses 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
DADTOT 
Constant 131.1246 26.4899 4.9500 0.0001 
DADEDUC -3.6666 10.8293 -0.3390 0.7349 
HRTOTD 0.0004 0.0055 0.0710 0.9437 
MOMTOT 
Constant 83.6510 21.5767 3.8770 0.0001 
MOMEDUC 16.2171 9.7345 1.6660 0.0957 
HRTOTM 0.0090 0.0047 1.9270 0.0540 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 454.4335 6^2775 73.3910 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 430.8273 6.9919 61.6180 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9436 0.0023 413.2190 0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations for DADTOT 903.00 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12874.42 
The purpose of equations (113) and (114) is to allow a test to determine if the 
cooperating or non-cooperating spouse model is a better representation of the household's 
demand equations. The coefficients for available time (a2, aj, p2, p3), found in table 5, are 
disappointing because they reflect collinearity between each spouse's available time. In each 
equation, one coefficient for available time has a very small, insignificant value. The 
multicolhnearity will be corrected in the next model, presented in table 6. The purpose of 
this model is to test whether each spouse's available time should be included in the demand 
equations. So in spite of the multicolhnearity, a likelihood ratio test can be used to test the 
following null and alternative hypothesis: 
H0: a3=p3=0 
Ha: 
The purpose of this test is to determine whether the cooperating spouse model is preferred to 
the non-cooperating spouse model. The null hypothesis supports the non-cooperating model. 
The calculated value of the test is found by -2*[(L(Pr)-L(Pur)], where L(Pr) is the maximum 
value of the restricted log-likelihood function and L(Pur) is the maximum value of the 
unrestricted log-likelihood function (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). Since the calculated 
value of the likelihood ratio test is 4.90 and the critical value at a 90% level is 4.61, we must 
reject the null hypothesis. This means that a cooperating household approach is statistically 
superior to a non-cooperating approach when estimating gifts of time. Table 6-A of the 
appendix shows how the results of table 5 are robust to adding the taste parameters back to 
the model. 
Table 5. Cooperating Spouses 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
DADTOT 
Constant 32.9307 55.9909 0.5880 0.5564 
DADEDUC -3.7824 10.8695 -0.3480 0.7279 
HRTOTD 0.0083 0.0140 0.5950 0.5518 
HRTOTM 0.0247 0.0123 2.0040 0.0450 
MOMTOT 
Constant -9.0211 53.9201 -0.1670 0.8671 
MOMEDUC 16.7423 9.7453 1.7180 0.0858 
HRTOTM 0.0300 0.0125 2.3950 0.0166 
HRTOTD 0.0095 0.0127 0.7470 0.4553 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma( 1 ) 452.9535 6.3838 70.9540 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 429.5973 6.9651 61.6790 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9432 0.0023 411.0570 0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations for DADTOT 903.00 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12871.97 
To correct for the multicollineartiy, the two spouses available time are added together 
to create household available time, HRTOTH. A likelihood ratio test is used to test the 
following null and alternative hypothesis from equations (113) and (114): 
H0: a2=a3 and p2=p3 
Ha: a2^aa and p2^P.3 
Since the calculated value of the likelihood ratio test is 1.10 and the critical value at a 99% 
level is 4.61, we must fail to reject the null hypothesis. This means that the cooperating 
household model is preferred, and it is appropriate to combine the available time of 
household members to use as an argument for each spouse's demand for time. Table 7-A of 
the appendix shows the model in table 6 with all of the taste parameters added. The 
robustness of the model is shown by comparing the similar results for the HRTOTH 
coefficients. 
Table 6. Cooperating Spouses 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error CoefT./SE Prob. Value 
DADTOT 
Constant 31.1211 54.4880 0.5710 0.5679 
DADEDUC -3.8383 10.7389 -0.3570 0.7208 
HRTOTH 0.0165 0.0080 2.0650 0.0389 
MOMTOT 
Constant -11.9137 53.4805 -0.2230 0.8237 
MOMEDUC 17.5062 9.7019 1.8040 0.0712 
HRTOTH 0.0198 0.0080 2.4770 0.0132 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 453.0804 6.2321 72.7010 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 429.8658 6.9077 62.2300 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9432 0.0023 416.1110 0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations for DADTOT 803.00 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12872.52 
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The previous analysis of the joint products model tested joint products demand 
equations in their reduced form. In chapter four, it was explained through the theoretical 
models how the joint products model can be tested versus a private and public good 
specification. With full-time applied to the model, one can test the joint products model 
versus the pure public model as discussed in the full-time section of chapter 4. By using a 
full-income approach and 2SLS, Sandler and Murdoch (1990) formulated a way to test for 
joint products' structural demand equations for military expenditure. The method used here 
to test for joint products is similar. The main difference is that tobit estimation is used 
instead of least squares. It is important to validate the joint products specification for times 
when the utility function is used for welfare analysis. The non-cooperating spouse model 
shows that each spouse's time appears as an argument in the other spouse's demand equation 
(equation (54) is reproduced below). 
A two-stage process, similar to 2SLS, will be applied to the demand equations so that the 
estimates of the coefficients are unbiased and efficient. Since choices of volunteer time by 
members of a household are simultaneous and censored at zero, the estimation technique is a 
two-stage bivarate tobit (2SBT) process. In the first stage, estimates of t(i) will be determined 
by a single equation tobit model using all of the exogenous variables as instruments. 
Equations (115) and (116) show how the first stage fitted values for t(j) are determined. 
DADTOT=a0+a,YRBORN+a2OVER62+a3KIDS+a4RLMEMB+a5DADEDUC 
tj > 0 
otherwise 
+a6HRTOTH +s. (115) 
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MOMTOT=p0+(3,YRBORN+p2OVER62+p3™S+(34RLMEMB+p5MOMEDUC 
+P(,HRTOTH +8. (116) 
The fitted values for DADTOT and MOMTOT are saved and renamed FITDAD and 
FITMOM respectively, hi order to properly use the fitted values in the second stage of the 
process, negative fitted values are assigned a zero value. In the second stage, the fitted values 
will be incorporated into the demand equations for one to see if the coefficients for the fitted 
values are significant. Significant coefficients for the fitted values mean that the joint 
products model is the correct choice for modeling household volunteer time. 
Equations (117) and (118) allow one to test the private good model versus the joint 
products model. The key to this econometric specification is that it shows each spouse's 
observed volunteer time linearly dependent on his or her spouse's predicted volunteer time: 
D ADTOT=cco+a i D ADEDUC+a2HRT OTH+a3FITMOM +e, (117) 
MOMTOT=p0+PiMOMEDUC+p2HRTOTH+p3FITDAD +8. (118) 
The following null hypothesis supports volunteer time as private good, and the alternative 
hypothesis supports a joint products model: 
H0: a3=p3=0 
Hg: a3#0 and p3*0. 
The coefficients are estimated simultaneously with a bivariate tobit model. The results in 
table 6.1 show that the null hypothesis must be rejected in favor of the joint products model. 
Table 8-A of the appendix shows that the results become mixed when the model of table 6.1 
has the taste parameters added. 
The next econometric specification is used to test the pure public model versus the 
joint products model. The second stage for the test is set up by applying the full-time 
convention to the model using the fitted values from the first stage. Full-time for each spouse 
is created by adding the fitted value for spouse's time to the observed HRTOTH for each 
spouse creating FULLHATD and FULLHATM for each spouse respectively. Finally, the 
dependent variable for each spouse is created by adding the fitted value of the other spouse's 
time to the observed DADTOT and MOMTOT respectively. Equations (119) and (120) 
represent the second stage demand equations for cooperating spouses with full-time: 
HTOTHATD=ao+a,DADEDUC+a2FULLHATD+a3FITMOM +s. (119) 
HTOTHATM=p0+PiMOMEDUC+p2FULLHATM+p3FITDAD +s. (120) 
Table 6.1 Private good model vs. joint products model, 2SBT 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
DADTOT 
Constant -181.1422 55.8027 -3.2460 0.0012 
DADEDUC 54.5755 13.3241 4.0960 0.0001 
HRTOTH 0.0032 0.0083 0.3920 0.6954 
FITMOM 1.0939 0.1308 8.3660 0.0001 
MOMTOT 
Constant -276.2230 57.5494 -4.8000 0.0001 
MOMEDUC 70.0317 11.8556 5.9070 0.0001 
HRTOTH 0.0149 0.0080 1.8680 0.0617 
FITDAD 1.0440 0.1216 8.5860 0.0001 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 439.0202 5.7807 75.9460 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 417.0088 6.5217 63.9420 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9377 0.0024 386.5040 0.0001 
Observations 1265 
Non-limit observations for DADTOT 903 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872 
Value of Log likelihood function 
-12836.44 
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This representation of the model allows a nested test of the joint products model. The 
following null hypothesis supports a pure public model, and the alternative hypothesis 
supports a joint products model: 
H0: a3=p3=0 
Ha: a3^0 and p3^0. 
The coefficients of the model are estimated simultaneously with a bivariate tobit model. The 
results in table 6.2 show that the null hypothesis must be rejected in favor of the joint 
products model. It has now been shown that the joint products model for volunteer time is 
superior to a pure public model. Table 9-A of the appendix shows the robustness of the 
results in table 6.2 by adding the taste parameters back into the model. 
This concludes the six model analysis of the logic that supports the full-time joint products 
model. By applying the full-time convention to the model in table 6 and adding back the 
shared demographic variables, the model in table 2 is restored. The full-time convention is 
applied to the empirical work in the same way that it is applied to the theory work of chapter 
four. The full-time convention allows one to look at the marginal effects of the independent 
variables at the individual and household level in the same model. 
Decomposing Household Level Giving 
The previous analysis of the data focused on married households. It showed how one 
spouse's time influenced the other's volunteer time and, therefore, the household's gifts. The 
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Table 6.2 Pure Public Model vs. Joint Products Model, 2SBT 
Variable 
HTOTHATD 
Constant 
DADEDUC 
FULLHATD 
FITMOM 
HTOTHATM 
Constant 
MOMEDUC 
FULLHATM 
FITDAD 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 
Sigma(2) 
RHO(l,2) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
9.1980 
20.2729 
0.0128 
1.4914 
-37.0192 
29.8270 
0.0177 
1.4526 
353.6776 
333.5008 
0.9407 
47.4019 
9.8591 
0.0066 
0.1015 
48.2010 
8.6418 
0.0063 
0.0935 
4.6633 
5.0894 
0.0020 
Coeff./SE 
0.1940 
2.0560 
1.9310 
14.6930 
-0.7680 
3.4510 
2.8020 
15.5400 
75.8420 
65.5280 
478.6200 
Prob. Value 
0.8461 
0.0398 
0.0534 
0.0001 
0.4425 
0.0006 
0.0051 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
Observations 
Non-limit observations for HTOTHATD 
Non-limit observations for HTOTHATM 
Value of Log likelihood function 
1265.00 
1265.00 
1265.00 
-16994.61 
following models include single and married households and show household total annual 
hours broken down to its components. Recall that total annual hours given is the sum of 
volunteer time to church (HCSHOURS) and volunteer time to other organizations 
(HSTIME), see figure 4 for details. The independent variables of (121) and (122) are the 
same ones used in the married household models. A bivariate tobit model is used to estimate 
the parameters because the dependent variables are determined simultaneously. 
HSTME=ao+aiYRBORN+a2OVER62+a3KIDS+a4RLMEMB+a5DADEDUC 
+a6HRTOTH +s. (121) 
HCSHOURS=po+(3iYRBORN+p20VER62+P3KIDS+p4RLMEMB+p5DADEDUC 
+p(,HRTOTH +£. (122) 
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Table 7. Decomposing Household Giving 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
HSTIME 
Constant -930.8803 74.1424 -12.5550 0.0001 
YRBORN 5.4385 1.4641 3.7140 0.0002 
OVER62 -25.0759 6.3157 -3.9700 0.0001 
KIDS 57.6026 34.4128 1.6740 0.0942 
RLMEMB 143.6501 33.3499 4.3070 0.0001 
HSEDUC 358.7059 38.4159 9.3370 0.0001 
HRTOTH 0.0708 0.0087 8.1750 0.0001 
HCSHOURS 
Constant -878.0800 64.6954 -13.5730 0.0001 
YRBORN 1.0635 1.1669 0.9110 0.3621 
OVER62 -11.8694 5.0119 -2.3680 0.0179 
KIDS 84.1072 29.3457 2.8660 0.0042 
RLMEMB 539.3997 32.1214 16.7930 0.0001 
HSEDUC 53.5249 29.3387 1.8240 0.0681 
HRTOTH 0.0417 0.0070 5.9630 0.0001 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 664.5229 7.1165 93.3780 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 489.1967 5.2108 93.8820 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.1969 0.0262 7.5250 0.0001 
Observations 2232.00 
Non-limit observations for HSTIME 1251.00 
Non-limit observations for HCSHOURS 890.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -17831.72 
Starting with the five demographic variables, an interpretation is given for each 
coefficient in the HSTIME equation presented in table 7. As people age, they tend to give 
more time before age 62 and less time after 62. The coefficient for age in the HSTIME 
equation implies that for every additional year of age before 62, a household increases annual 
time volunteered to non-church activities by 5.44 hours. After age 62, the household reduces 
annual non-church volunteering by 25.08 hours. The coefficient for KIDS indicates that 
children do not significantly effect hours given to non-church activities at the 5% level of 
significance, but do at a 10% level. The church membership coefficient, a3=143.65, has a 
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prob-value of .0001. This is interesting in that it implies church members give 144 hours 
more time to non-church events than non-members. The coefficient for HSEDUC, 
oc5=358.71, suggests that on average households with education greater than high school give 
about 359 more annual hours to other organizations. The coefficient for available time, 
HRTOTH, is a6=.0708. This means that for each additional hour of available time, the 
household gives an additional 4.25 minutes to other organizations. 
Next is an interpretation of the coefficients for the church time equation, 
HCSHOURS. Each additional year of age before 62 has an insignificant impact on 
volunteering to church. For every additional year of age after 62, households tend to reduce 
hours given to church by 11.87 hours per year. The coefficient for KIDS, p2=84.1.1, means 
that children in households causes those households to volunteer 84 hours more to church 
annually. As expected, the coefficient for RLMEMB is significant and large. It implies that 
members of a church give 539 hours more time to church than non-members. Higher 
education, HSEDUC, has an insignificant effect on church volunteering. Available time, 
HRTOTH=.0417, has a significant impact on decisions of time volunteered to church. This 
means that for each hour of available time the household gives 2.50 minutes to church. 
In analyzing the coefficients across equations one draws some interesting conclusions 
about the behavior of households in their allocation of time to different types of 
organizations. The coefficients of age, OVER62, show a slightly greater reduction in non-
church time with age for households over 62. For households under age 62, volunteering to 
non-church activities increases with age, while volunteering for church activities are not 
sensitive to age. The coefficients of KIDS both show a positive effect for the two types of 
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volunteering. KIDS are significant at only a 10% level of significance for non-church giving 
but significant at a 1% level for church giving. Church volunteering is more sensitive to the 
presence of children than non-church volunteering. 
There is evidence to suggest that households give higher priority to church time. By 
assuming that only members gave to church, one sees that there are 890 givers. Since there 
are 1,498 observations of total household time, HTOTANHR, there must have been 608 non-
member givers (1498-890). Due to there being 1,251 givers of non-church time (HSTIME), 
643 of them must have been church members (1251-608). This implies that there are 247 
members who gave to church but did not give to other organizations. Therefore, the data 
suggests that members of a church first look to church to give time and then to other 
organizations. 
The education coefficient is another interesting one to decompose into parts because it 
is positive and large for volunteer time at other organizations but insignificant for church 
volunteer time at a 5% level of significance (prob. value=.0681). Available time is 
significant to the decision of volunteer time to other organizations and in volunteer time to 
church. Household's volunteer time to non-church activities is more sensitive to available 
time than household's volunteer time to church. Andreoni, Gale, Scholz, 1995 commented, 
"There is a presumption in the literature that religious giving is somehow different than other 
forms of giving" (p. 25). This paper uncovers evidence that supports this statement in terms 
of voluntary time given. 
One of the more important variables in determination of volunteer time is what other 
types of time are being given. The bivariate tobit model provides us with that information 
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through the correlation coefficient, rho. A rho that is positive and significant means that gifts 
of time to church and time to other organizations tend to be effected the same way from 
unobserved disturbances. Rho=.1969 implies that there is a weak positive correlation among 
the error terms. This finding is one of the more important findings of this dissertation. The 
significance of rho identifies the inefficiencies of modeling volunteer hours without 
acknowledging the interdependencies of various time gifts. 
The next model analyzes volunteer hours at the most aggregate level for this data set. 
The givers are viewed as a household rather than an individual, and the gifts to various 
activities are summed together as one dependent variable, HTOTANHR (see figure 4). This 
model is included in the dissertation to show how the coefficients change when the 
interdependencies of time gifts are ignored. Equation (123) shows household total annual 
hours linearly dependent on five taste parameters and available time. 
HTOTANHR=y0+YiYRBORN472OVER62+Y3KIDS+Y4RLMEMB+Y5HSEDUC 
+Y(,HRTOTH +e. (123) 
Table 8 presents the results of using a single equation tobit model to estimate the 
coefficients in equation (123). One can see that the signs of the estimates are mostly 
consistent with those of the bivariate model, however, the magnitudes of the estimates 
indicate how the household treats the two types of gifts differently. 
Provided next is an explanation for each of the coefficients presented in table 8. 
The coefficient for age indicates that total hours given increases by 4.13 hours per year for 
each additional year of age before 62. After age 62, however, volunteering falls by 26.38 
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Table 8. Total Household gifts 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
HTOTANHR 
Constant -864.4617 75.6093 -11.4330 0.0001 
YRBORN 4.1306 1.5151 2.7260 0.0064 
OVER62 -26.3832 5.7765 -4.5670 0.0001 
KIDS 61.7080 34.5259 1.7870 0.0739 
RLMEMB 365.9042 35.4195 10.3310 0.0001 
HSEDUC 296.7901 36.9417 8.0340 0.0001 
HRTOTH 0.0824 0.0089 9.3010 0.0001 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma 722.4418 13.6950 52.7520 0.0001 
Observations 2232.00 
Non-limit observations for HTOTANHR 1498.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12478.36 
hours per year for each additional year of age. The coefficient for KIDS is significant at a 
10% level. This implies that the presence of children leads a household to give about 62 
hours more time per year. The church membership coefficient, 73=365.90, has a prob-value 
of .0001. This means that a household that is a member of a church tends to give 366 more 
volunteer hours per year to all types of activities when compared to a non-member. The 
variable for education, HSEDUC, has a coefficient that is significant and positive. This 
suggests that on average people with education greater than high school give about 297 more 
annual hours to all types of volunteering. Available time, HRTOTH, is important to the 
decision of how much time a household allocates to volunteering. A value of .0824 means 
that for each additional hour of available time, the household volunteers an additional 4.94 
minutes to all types of organizations. 
By comparing results of table 7 and 8, one can see the effect of differentiating 
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different types of volunteer time. For example, total household volunteer hours is not 
sensitive to whether a household has children or not at a 5% level. The results of the 
bivariate tobit model, however, show that the KIDS coefficient is significant for church 
volunteering, but insignificant for non-church volunteering at a 5% level of significance. 
This means that the insignificant effect of KIDS on non-church time, a?, must have 
overwhelmed the significant effect of KIDS on church time, p?, in the total effect, y?. 
Decomposing household giving has given insight to the interdependencies of various 
types of gifts. When one is looking at the demand for a specific type of volunteering, it is 
important to analyze other types of volunteering the household is currently doing. This was 
shown by the significance of rho in the bivariate tobit model of table 7. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Charitable gifts of time impact the welfare of individuals and society. To this date, 
theoretical and empirical research has been insufficient to make confident predictions on the 
demand for hours given to nonprofit organizations. This dissertation is distinct from previous 
research in two ways. One is that it presents a theoretical model that derives demand 
equations for time without prices. This is accomplished by use of a separable utility function 
in which all income is spent in the branch where market goods are chosen. The goods 
"volunteer time" and leisure are chosen in a branch of the utility function where the only 
binding constraint is the number of hours left in a day after work and sleep. The second way 
this work is distinct is that demand for volunteer time by households is estimated by using 
data on each spouse's gifts. The simultaneous estimation of the parameters of the model 
gives insights to the giving behavior among spouses. 
This paper offers a different theoretical approach to modeling gifts of time by 
modeling the household instead of just an individual. Empirical results found herein support 
a household approach to estimation of time giving behavior. The simultaneous decisions of 
the household on the spouse's level of time gifts are ground out from the theoretical model 
and tested with a bivariate tobit model. The theory work put forth also recognizes the 
potential for an agent to receive utility not only from the level of the public good but also 
from his/her private contribution to the public good. This concept is known as joint products 
theory. Empirical results found herein support the idea that households receive utility in. 
multiple ways from their gifts of time. The theoretical models are tested empirically by 
analyzing a national sample of giving behavior. Statistical tests are performed to show the 
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joint products approach is preferred to a pure public and pure private consumption model. 
Previous research has found that spouses tend to give time together (Andreoni, Brown and 
Rischall, 1999), but quantifies those results using a probit approach. The tobit approach of 
this paper allows one to see more clearly the quantitative effects of the independent variables. 
Models of household gifts of time have not been thoroughly explored to this point. 
Theoretical models of this kind can take a closer look at allocations of gifts among spouses. 
Application of the joint products model proves to be essential to the determination of time 
gifts. The following bullets outline the results of this dissertation: 
• A joint products approach that explains household's utility and associcated demand 
equations for time gifts is shown to be superior to other methods. 
• Previous models of time and money have come from unspecified utility functions which 
limits the ability to do policy simulations (Brown and Lankford, 1992). This study 
presents a separable utility function and empirical evidence suggesting the validity of the 
separable utility function. 
• Previous research has suggested hours given to be partially dependent on the tax price of 
charitable gifts of money. The theory chapter shows the inconsistency of using the tax 
price of monetary contributions in the determination of time gifts. 
• This dissertation brings to the literature a new data set to test and compare to previous 
findings of monetary and time gift studies. This information is valuable because of the 
lack of data to date on gifts of time. 
• Unlike previous research, this study evaluates the giving behavior among spouses, finding 
that spouses tend to give time together. This is contrary to the way some economists 
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conceive giving behavior. An opportunity cost approach predicts that the spouse with 
lower opportunity cost, measured in wages foregone, will be the one volunteering more 
time. The opportunity cost approach suggests a substitution of one spouse's time for the 
other's time; the results of this research suggest a complementary relationship of each 
spouse's volunteer time. This finding is similar to the finding that people who give 
money, also tend to give time (Freeman, 1997). 
The data indicate that households first tend to give time to their church and then give time 
to other organizations. 
Interdependences among various types of volunteering exist. Researchers may not be 
getting the most efficient results if the interdependences among various gifts of time are 
ignored. The use of simultaneous equation techniques in this paper uncovered a 
relationship among different types of giving as well as the interdependences among 
spouses. The amount of error a researcher is making by not considering the correlation 
between dependent variables diminishes the smaller the correlation coefficient is. 
The household views gifts of time to other organizations and gifts of time to church to be 
complements in their budgeting of available time. 
The data confirms the importance of available time in the household's decision of time 
gifts. In the main empirical model of the household, available time is cast as full-time. 
Full-time in this paper is similar to full-income in other research. It is a way to deal with 
externalities. The use of full-time is helpful in setting up the theoretical models for 
empirical testing. The first order conditions with the full-time convention applied are 
proven to be equivalent to the first order conditions derived for the household. 
The data set used in this study did not allow the demand equations derived from the 
utility functions of "Cooperating Spouses Considering Other's Time" to be tested. Future 
research could test that theoretical approach if there is a data set containing information on 
household's gifts to a specific charity. One could then proceed on with the thought that one 
person's gift of time is dependent on how many other people are contributing to the good. 
Future empirical studies with data of this nature should continue to identify the importance of 
group effects on charitable gifts of time. 
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APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table 1-A. Monetary gifts to church 
level of gift # of givers % at each level 
$0 
$25 
$75 
$175 
$375 
$750 
$1,750 
$2,500 
111 
267 
226 
280 
270 
228 
211 
107 
7% 
16% 
13% 
16% 
16% 
13% 
12% 
6% 
total attendees 
total givers 
1700 
1589 
100% 
average gift among attendees $577.43 
average gift among givers $815.83 
107 people gave more than $2,500, so the calculated average gift is lower than what it really is. 
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Table 2-A. Time gifts to church 
hours/wk # of people 
0 913 
1 258 
2 190 
3 92 
4 65 
5 45 
6 28 
7 9 
8 25 
10 29 
12 12 
13 1 
14 3 
15 9 
16 2 
17 1 
20 10 
24 1 
25 2 
26 1 
30 3 
35 1 
40 2 
42 1 
50 2 
60 3 
72 1 
1709 
average among attendees per week 1.9906 
average among givers per week 4.2739 
Cases 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
2232 
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General Statistics for all respondents 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
62.600 170.369 0 2600 
0.543 0.498 0 1 
0.312 0.463 0 1 
5242.554 2023.827 0 14127 
0.463 0.499 0 1 
108.680 280.702 0 4368 
5063.418 1967.571 0 12775 
3290.487 1287.951 0 7300 
1772.931 1654.140 0 6205 
201.593 468.000 0 4853 
310.273 580.831 0 6067 
0.483 0.500 0 1 
116.536 262.173 0 3120 
0.629 0.483 0 1 
179.136 332.531 0 3328 
46.079 136.626 0 2288 
85.058 243.035 0 2773 
131.137 302.070 0 3467 
42.561 16.086 18 92 
Cases 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
1265 
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General statistics for married respondents 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
66.017 165.159 0 2080 
0.556 0.497 0 1 
0.550 0.498 0 1 
6359.581 1710.329 1996 14127 
0.498 0.500 0 1 
147.321 334.212 0 4368 
6.563 4.705 0 16 
6165.705 1648.386 1996 12775 
3037.499 1212.806 0 6935 
3128.206 765.836 1631 6205 
277.936 568.711 0 4853 
425.257 691.253 0 6067 
0.649 0.477 0 1 
127.858 267.085 0 2080 
0.660 0.474 0 1 
193.876 327.998 0 2600 
81.303 173.439 0 2288 
150.078 307.389 0 2773 
6.561 4.284 0 10 
231.381 371.267 0 3467 
43.439 13.822 19 89 
ases 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
967 
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General statistics for single respondents 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
58.130 176.939 0 2600 
0.527 0.500 0 1 
0.418 0.493 0 1 
58.130 176.939 0 2600 
5.897 4.778 0 16 
3621.440 1308.805 0 7300 
3621.440 1308.805 0 7300 
101.724 254.983 0 3120 
159.854 337.568 0 3328 
0.265 0.441 0 1 
101.724 254.983 0 3120 
0.587 0.493 0 1 
159.854 337.568 0 3328 
41.414 18.581 18 92 
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Table 6-A. Cooperating Spouse model of Table 5 with shared RHS 
Variable 
DADTOT 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
DADEDUC 
HRTOTD 
HRTOTM 
MOMTOT 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
MOMEDUC 
HRTOTM 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 
Sigma(2) 
RHO(l,2) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-306.4434 
4.6688 
-20.7876 
13.0230 
222.5881 
-5.1396 
0.0042 
0.0289 
-299.5146 
4.6044 
-19.1551 
-11.7978 
213.3344 
15.1867 
0.0315 
441.2153 
418.1865 
0.9403 
80.9852 
1.3571 
6.3325 
32.6635 
28.8205 
11.0742 
0.0068 
0.0120 
75.0993 
1.2697 
6.0544 
29.5386 
27.2911 
9.8229 
0.0125 
6.1775 
6.8357 
0.0024 
Coeff./SE 
-3.7840 
3.4400 
-3.2830 
0.3990 
7.7230 
-0.4640 
0.6210 
2.4130 
-3.9880 
3.6260 
-3.1640 
-0.3990 
7.8170 
1.5460 
2.5080 
71.4230 
61.1770 
387.8730 
Prob. Value 
0.0002 
0.0006 
0.0010 
0.6901 
0.0001 
0.6426 
0.5347 
0.0158 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0016 
0.6896 
0.0001 
0 .1221  
0.0122 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
Observations 
Non-limit observations forDADTOT 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 
Value of Log likelihood function 
1265.00 
903.00 
872.00 
-12824.86 
Table 6-A shows how one cannot reject the addition of Mom's available time to 
Dad's volunteer time equation. The coefficient for HRTOTM has a probability value of 
.0158. This is another argument supporting the cooperating spouse model over the non-
cooperating spouse model. 
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Table 7-A. Cooperating Spouse model of Table 6 with shared RHS 
DADTOT 
Variable 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
DADEDUC 
HRTOTH 
MOMTOT 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
MOMEDUC 
HRTOTH 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 
Sigma(2) 
RHO(l,2) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-314.1923 
4.4361 
-21.3744 
13.4802 
223.0139 
-5.1992 
0.0190 
-308.8728 
4.3205 
-19.8623 
-11.1038 
213.8220 
16.1622 
0.0186 
441.3375 
418.4958 
0.9403 
84.9771 
1.3595 
6.3472 
32.7235 
28.6077 
11.0233 
0.0088 
81.2023 
1.2748 
6.1058 
29.7262 
27.3158 
9.7835 
0.0093 
6.0883 
6.7860 
0.0024 
Coeff./SE 
-3.6970 
3.2630 
-3.3680 
0.4120 
7.7960 
-0.4720 
2.1650 
-3.8040 
3.3890 
-3.2530 
-0.3740 
7.8280 
1.6520 
2.0090 
72.4890 
61.6710 
391.9520 
Prob. Value 
0.0002 
0.0011 
0.0008 
0.6804 
0.0001 
0.6372 
0.0304 
0.0001 
0.0007 
0.0011 
0.7087 
0.0001 
0.0985 
0.0446 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations forDADTOT 903.00 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12825.88 
Table 7-A shows the cooperating spouse model of Table 6 with all of the taste 
parameters added. This is included in the appendix because the focus in this section of the 
main body of the dissertation was on available time and not the taste parameters. As one can 
see, the significance and magnitude of the HRTOTH coefficients are only slightly different. 
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Table 8-A. Joint Products vs. Private Good with shared RHS 
DADTOT 
MOMTOT 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coeff./SE Prob. Value 
Constant -353.7741 88.3745 -4.0030 0.0001 
YRBORN 4.0417 1.6402 2.4640 0.0137 
OVER62 -18.3492 7.8055 -2.3510 0.0187 
KIDS 17.9538 32.7265 0.5490 0.5833 
RLMEMB 197.0481 47.9016 4.1140 0.0001 
DADEDUC 60.5567 23.1688 2.6140 0.0090 
HRTOTH 0.0167 0.0101 1.6460 0.0998 
FITMOM 0.1845 0.2953 0.6250 0.5322 
Constant -328.5715 80.9681 -4.0580 0.0001 
YRBORN 1.1672 1.5644 0.7460 0.4556 
OVER62 -6.4654 7.2029 -0.8980 0.3694 
KIDS -16.1732 29.6960 -0.5450 0.5860 
RLMEMB 74.7135 49.4500 1.5110 0.1308 
MOMEDUC 21.2950 18.0924 1.1770 0.2392 
HRTOTH 0.0134 0.0095 1.4210 0.1554 
FITDAD 1.0581 0.3156 3.3520 0.0008 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 439.0056 6.0024 73.1380 0.0001 
Sigma(2) 416.6475 6.7405 61.8120 0.0001 
RHO(l,2) 0.9394 0.0025 382.9780 0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations forDADTOT 903.00 
Non-limit observations for MOMTOT 872.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -12819.22 
Table 8-A shows the cooperating spouse model of Table 6.1 with all of the taste parameters added. 
Adding the taste parameters to the equations leads to a mixed result for the test of the joint products model 
versus the private good model. In Table 6.1, FITDAD and FITMOM were both positive and significant. 
However, in the model with all the taste parameters added, the DADTOT equation has FITMOM as 
insignificant, and in the MOMTOT equation FITDAD is significant. 
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Table 9-A. Joint Products vs. Public Good with shared RHS 
Variable 
HTOTHATD 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
DADEDUC 
FULLHATD 
FITMOM 
HTOTHATM 
Constant 
YRBORN 
OVER62 
KIDS 
RLMEMB 
MOMEDUC 
FULLHATM 
FITDAD 
Variances and Correlation 
Sigma(l) 
Sigma(2) 
RHO(l,2) 
Coefficient Standard Error 
-86.5336 
2.3732 
-15.0674 
-7.4428 
132.2029 
26.8194 
0.0234 
0.8702 
-64.8355 
0.3743 
-6.4995 
-26.2729 
44.1447 
-2.8325 
0.0186 
1.5219 
352.3896 
332.2565 
0.9412 
77.0203 
1.3292 
6.7222 
25.9942 
38.1482 
17.7560 
0.0081 
0.2257 
68.1949 
1.1909 
5.8606 
23.1847 
38.8714 
13.4516 
0.0074 
0.2374 
4.8704 
5.3349 
0.0021 
Coeff./SE 
-1.1240 
1.7850 
-2.2410 
-0.2860 
3.4660 
1.5100 
2.8930 
3.8560 
-0.9510 
0.3140 
-1.1090 
-1.1330 
1.1360 
-0.2110 
2.4970 
6.4100 
72.3530 
62.2800 
454.1930 
Prob. Value 
0.2612 
0.0742 
0.0250 
0.7746 
0.0005 
0.1309 
0.0038 
0.0001 
0.3417 
0.7533 
0.2674 
0.2571 
0.2561 
0.8332 
0.0125 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0001 
Observations 1265.00 
Non-limit observations for HTOTHATD 1265.00 
Non-limit observations for HTOTHATM 1265.00 
Value of Log likelihood function -16980.14 
Table 9-A shows the cooperating spouse model of Table 6.2 with all of the taste 
parameters added. Adding the taste parameters to the equations leads to the same conclusion 
for the test of the joint products model versus the private good model. Since FITMOM and 
FITDAD are significant in each equation respectively, the joint products model is superior to 
the public good specification. The robustness of the joint products model is shown through 
this alternative specification. 
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